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
 
ABSTRACT 
Since 1933, the U.S. House of Representatives has maintained a 
procedure, the self-executing rule, that permits a single floor vote to pass 
multiple independent bills. Using this procedure, the House can pass a bill 
and, at the same time, “deem passed” entirely separate bills via a single 
floor vote. Some legal scholars have argued that this procedure is 
constitutionally unobjectionable, provided that members of the House 
clearly understand the legislative effects, whether singular or plural, of a 
particular vote. Others, however, have argued that the device violates the 
Constitution because the House and Senate do not vote on the same 
question. Careful consideration of the relevant constitutional text and 
legislative history reveals that the question does not have an easy or 
obvious answer. Perhaps surprisingly, the Constitution does not speak 
with clarity on whether a single floor vote may pass multiple, separate 
bills, nor does the Constitution’s legislative history provide any clear 
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guidance on this question. Instead, the answer depends on whether one 
generally embraces formalism or functionalism in one’s separation of 
powers analysis. From a formalist perspective, the House and Senate must 
not only adopt the same identical text, but must also vote on the same 
question. From a functionalist perspective, however, the precise procedure 
used to approve the text should not matter so long as both the House and 
Senate take political responsibility for adopting a particular statutory text. 
Given the relatively weak reasons that undergird the House’s use of the 
deem-and-pass procedure—namely a desire to avoid political 
responsibility for unpopular legislation by rendering electoral 
accountability more difficult—the formalist position has much to 
recommend it. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2010, Rep. Louise Slaughter, then-chair of the Rules 
Committee of the House of Representatives, with the approval of then-
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the House Democratic party leadership, 
publicly floated the idea of using a special “self-executing” rule to permit 
the members of the House to use a single floor vote to adopt a bill that 
would simultaneously amend and pass the Senate-enacted health care 
reform bill.
1
 Under the special rule, dubbed the “Slaughter Solution” by 
critics,
2
 House approval of the separate House-originated amendments bill 
 
 
 1. See Jess Bravin, Legislative Maneuver Would Spur Challenges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2010, 
at A4 (“The House Rules Committee, which has broad authority over how the chamber handles bills, 
could create a rule that once the House approves the package of changes, the chamber would be 
‘deemed’ to have approved the main Senate bill as well. That could allow House Democrats to claim, 
with technical accuracy, that they never voted for the Senate bill and to avoid association with its 
unpopular provisions.”); David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Consider New Maneuvers 
for Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A18 (“House Democrats are so skittish about the piece 
of legislation that is now the vehicle for overhauling the health care system—the bill passed by the 
Senate in December—that they are considering a maneuver that would allow them to pass it without 
explicitly voting for it.”). For a particularly outraged editorial reaction to the proposed use of a special 
rule to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act, see Editorial, Slaughter House 
Rules: How Democrats May ‘Deem’ ObamaCare Into Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2010, at A22 
(“We’re not sure American schools teach civics any more, but once upon a time they taught that under 
the U.S. Constitution a bill had to pass both the House and Senate to become law. Until this week, that 
is, when Speaker Nancy Pelosi is moving to merely ‘deem’ that the House has passed the Senate 
health-care bill and then send it to President Obama to sign anyway.”). 
 2. See Jerry Zremski, ‘Slaughter Solution’ Is Health Bill’s Flash Point, BUFFALO NEWS 
(Buffalo, NY), Mar. 17, 2010, at A1. Coined by GOP members of the House of Representatives 
vehemently opposed to enactment of health care reform legislation, the catch-phrase “Slaughter 
Solution” was intended to be a pejorative phrase; accordingly “[Rep.] Slaughter seemed nonplussed 
that her last name was being used to try to tar the Democrats as they close in on their singular goal: 
health care reform.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
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would also “deem” passed the Senate bill.3 The vote on the amendments 
legislation would, therefore, advance the Senate bill to the President for 
his consideration and also send a new House bill containing amendments 
to the Senate bill to the Senate for its consideration.
4
 If the Senate enacted 
the House amendments bill, that bill would also be presented to the 
President for his consideration; the fate of the House amendments bill, 
however, would be wholly independent of the fate of the Senate version of 
the healthcare reform legislation. 
Then-Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer defended the proposed 
parliamentary maneuver arguing that the use of a special rule “deeming” 
the Senate bill enacted upon passage of the House amendatory bill “is 
consistent with the rules” and “is consistent with former practice.”5 
President Barack Obama also demurred when asked about the legitimacy 
of using this procedure to enact comprehensive health care reform, saying 
“I don’t spend a lot of time worrying about what the procedural rules are 
in the House or Senate” and suggesting that “[i]f people vote yes, 
whatever form that takes, that is going to be a vote for health-care 
reform.”6 
A public outcry against this “deem-and-pass” procedure arose,7 and the 
House leadership ultimately abandoned the plan, instead holding a 
 
 
 3. See Adam Nagourney, Point of (Dis)order, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at WK1 (noting that 
“House Democrats . . . were moving to pass the Senate health care bill over the weekend with a deem-
and-pass maneuver, which means they would be voting on fixes to the Senate bill after agreeing that 
the vote would also serve to pass the Senate bill itself, something many Congressional Democrats were 
loath to do.”); see also Ezra Klein, Nancy Pelosi’s Strategy for Passing Health-Care Reform, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 15, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/03/nancy_pelosis_ 
strategy_for_pas.html (noting that “Pelosi said that she favors the ‘deem and pass’ strategy”). Klein 
further explains: 
Here’s how that will work: Rather than passing the Senate bill and then passing the fixes, the 
House will pass the fixes under a rule that says the House “deems” the Senate bill passed after 
the House passes the fixes. 
The virtue of this, for Pelosi’s members, is that they don’t actually vote on the Senate bill. 
They only vote on the reconciliation package. But their vote on the reconciliation package 
functions as a vote on the Senate bill. The difference is semantic, but the bottom line is this: 
When the House votes on the reconciliation fixes, the Senate bill is passed, even if the Senate 
hasn’t voted on the reconciliation fixes, and even though the House never specifically voted 
on the Senate bill. 
Id. 
 4. See Herszenhorn & Pear, supra note 1 (“The idea is to package the changes and the 
underlying bill together in a way that amounts to an amended bill in a single vote.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bravin, supra note 1. 
 7. See, e.g., Zremski, supra note 2 (“Meanwhile, right-wing blogs were filled with talk that 
Slaughter was committing treason, the Wall Street Journal editorial page weighed in against what it 
called ‘Slaughter House Rules,’ and conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh said: ‘The House 
Democrats are ripping up the Constitution.’”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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separate floor vote on the Senate health reform bill and then a second, 
wholly independent vote on the House amendments legislation.
8
 Upon 
passage in the House, the Senate health care reform bill advanced to the 
President and the separate amendments bill advanced to the Senate for its 
consideration.
9
 
During the contretemps over the possible use of deem–and-pass to 
enact the Senate bill without amendments, leading constitutional law 
scholars offered strikingly divergent opinions regarding the 
constitutionality of the procedure. Professor Michael McConnell argued 
that the deem-and-pass maneuver was patently unconstitutional;
10
 whereas 
Professor Jack Balkin opined that the procedure was assuredly 
constitutional.
11
 Other legal academics offered summary conclusions on 
the question in the press without providing any independent constitutional 
 
 
 8. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Health Vote Is Done, but Partisan Debate Rages 
On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19; see also Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane, Health-care 
Cliffhanger, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1 (“House leaders determined Saturday that they will 
stage a vote on the Senate’s health-care bill, dropping a much-criticized strategy of allowing 
lawmakers to deem the landmark legislation into law.”); id. (“Pelosi’s decision to have the House hold 
two votes, one on the Senate bill and one on a separate package of revisions, reversed her position 
from earlier in the week, when she said she preferred to use a legislative procedure called ‘deem and 
pass.’”); Nagourney, supra note 3 (noting that “Democrats on Saturday dropped the deem-and-pass 
idea, presumably figuring that it might have been one legislative maneuver too many”). 
 9. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Sends White House Landmark Health 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1. “With the 219-to-212 vote, the House gave final 
approval to legislation passed by the Senate on Christmas Eve.” Id. The House adopted the bill 
proposing amendments to the Senate legislation by a vote of 220 to 211. Id. The Senate bill, as 
amended by the separate House “fixes” legislation, is now law. See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 10. Michael W. McConnell, Editorial, The Health Vote and the Constitution—II, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 20, 2010, at A15 (“This approach appears unconstitutional.”). 
 11. Jack Balkin, Is Deem and Pass Constitutional?, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 15, 2010, 10:00 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/03/is-deem-and-pass-constitutional.html (“Under Article I, section 5 
of the Constitution, the House can determine its own rules for passing legislation. There are plenty of 
precedents for passing legislation by reference through a special rule.”); id. (“The House may do this 
on a single vote if the special rule that accompanies the reconciliation bill says that by passing the 
reconciliation bill the House agrees to pass the same text of the same bill that the Senate has passed.”); 
see also McConnell, supra note 10 (“Rep. Louise Slaughter (D., N.Y.), chair of the House Rules 
Committee and prime mover behind this approach, has released a letter from Yale Law School’s Jack 
Balkin asserting that a ‘rule which consolidates a vote on a bill and accompanying amendments, or, as 
in this case, a reconciliation measure and an amended bill, is within the House’s powers under Article 
I, Section 5, Clause 2.’”); Warren Richey, Even Before House Vote on Healthcare Bill, Legal 
Challenges Loom, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 19, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor. 
com/USA/Politics/2010/0319/Even-before-House-vote-on-healthcare-bill-legal-challenges-loom (“Yale Law 
Prof. Jack Balkin disagrees with McConnell’s precise reading of the requirement. He has written on 
his popular blog that the House maneuver would satisfy constitutional requirements provided the 
House accepts the same text as the Senate bill as its own act.”). The text of Professor Balkin’s letter of 
March 18, 2010, to Rep. Slaughter, regarding the constitutional status of the proposed self-executing 
rule may be found at: http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/03/michael-mcconnell-and-metaphysics-of.html 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter “Balkin Letter”]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
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analysis.
12
 Finally, some legal commentators seemed rather unclear on 
precisely what the procedure entailed, but nevertheless expressed 
skepticism about it.
13
 
Because the House leadership ultimately abjured the use of the special 
rule, the controversy has largely fallen away. Ultimately, President Obama 
signed both the original Senate bill
14
 and House amendatory bill
15
 into 
law,
16
 and the Supreme Court subsequently sustained the law’s individual 
mandate to purchase health insurance coverage, a central enforcement 
feature of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
17
 Even so, the 
 
 
 12. For example, Professor Michael Dorf, of the Cornell Law School, endorsed Balkin’s 
analysis, see Bravin, supra note 1 (“It still will be the case that the legislation had majority support in 
both houses and signature by the president.”) (internal quotations omitted), whereas Professor Ronald 
Rotunda argued that McConnell’s analysis was correct, see Ashby Jones, On Health Care Reform and 
the Constitution, Part IV, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Mar. 18, 2010, 10:13 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj. 
com/law/2010/03/18/on-health-care-reform-and-the-constitution-part-iv/ (noting Rotunda’s suggestion 
that the argument against the constitutionality of the deem and pass procedure “is a reasonable one, 
and I wouldn’t be surprised if the court bought it”). 
 13. See, e.g., Fred Barbash, ‘Slaughter Solution’ Could Face Legal Challenge, POLITICO, Mar. 
16, 2010, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/34508.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2012) (quoting George Washington University law professor Alan Morrison). Professor Morrison 
stated that:  
[y]ou run the risk that it could be declared unconstitutional. If both houses vote on the 
substance of everything, then I’m not troubled. But if it looks like the House is never going to 
vote on the Senate bill, that’s very troubling. I wouldn’t want to stake the entire bill on that.  
Id. (internal ellipsis omitted). But, under a special rule whereby the passage of bill A implies the 
passage of bill B, the House votes on both bills by implication, and it does so twice—first, when it 
adopts the special rule with the deem and pass provision and again, when it votes on the bill that serves 
to “piggyback” the bill being enacted by implication. Professor Morrison added, unhelpfully, “‘What 
does ‘deem’ mean? In class I always say it means ‘let’s pretend.’ ‘Deems’ means it’s not true.’” Id. 
This comment seems to reflect a misunderstanding of how a special rule adopting a deem-and-pass 
procedure actually works; it does not involve any “pretending” or a “fake” vote on the bill being 
passed by implication. Instead, the procedure simply links up two separate pieces of legislation for the 
purpose of a holding a single floor vote. It is akin to adopting an amendment and then passing a bill, 
but differs in that the two bills remain entirely separate legislative vehicles (as opposed to an amended 
bill, which constitutes a single legislative vehicle after final passage on the floor). 
 14. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/ 
PLAW-111publ148.pdf. The Senate amended this House bill and the House then simply enacted the 
Senate’s version of the original bill—without any amendments—in order to avoid having to send a 
further amended bill back to the Senate, where 60 votes would have been required to overcome a 
certain filibuster by the GOP caucus. 
 15. H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010); Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries 
and Pension Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280, available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ192/pdf/PLAW-111publ192.pdf. 
 16. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and It’s Official, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012, at A19 (“Mr. Obama signed the measure, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, during a festive and at times raucous ceremony in the East Room of the White House.”). 
 17. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rules of the House of Representatives still permit use of the deem-and-pass 
procedure, and its constitutional status deserves more sustained analysis 
than it has received to date. Indeed, no carefully considered legal analysis 
of the procedure exists in scholarly literature, and only a handful of law 
review articles mention self-executing rules at all.
18
 The rather 
fundamental question of what it means for a house of Congress to “pass” a 
bill demands more thorough attention and analysis. 
The answer to the constitutional question of whether a single floor vote 
may pass multiple, separate bills does not have an obvious answer.
19
 The 
text of the Constitution does not clearly resolve this question.
20
 Nor is 
recourse to the legislative history of the Constitution much help in 
answering what, at first blush, seems as if it should be an easy, indeed 
obvious, issue.
21
 
Ultimately, the constitutionality of a special rule using the deem-and-
pass maneuver turns on extra-textual considerations that generally track 
the debate between formalist and functionalist theories about the 
separation of powers.
22
 From a formalist perspective, deem-and-pass is 
objectionable because each house of Congress does not vote on the exact 
same question incident to consideration of an identical legislative vehicle. 
Instead, the House of Representatives votes on the Senate-passed bill, in 
addition to other legislative acts. These other acts could include bills 
originating in the House of Representatives, other Senate-passed bills, and 
conceivably even overrides of presidential vetoes. This arguably 
undermines the bicameralism requirement set forth in Article I, Section 
7.
23
 If, as Professor McConnell argues, Article I, Section 7 requires both 
 
 
 18. See Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 1018 (2002); Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline 
of Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 358 
(1994). 
 19. See infra notes 78–100, 142–48 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. Neither the extant records of the Federal Convention nor the Federalist Papers directly 
address precisely how each house of Congress must “pass” a pending bill. See infra notes 101–45. 
 22. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When 
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 860–79 (2009) (discussing 
“formalism” and “functionalism” in the context of separation of powers theory and doctrine). 
Although I have adopted the nomenclature of “formalism” and “functionalism,” I fully recognize that 
some prominent legal scholars have questioned the utility of traditional separation of powers analysis 
and thinking in light of the modern reality of blended functions shared among the three branches of the 
federal government. See, e.g., EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW 
FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 633 (2000); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001). 
 23. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
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houses to conduct votes on identical questions, the use of a self-executing 
rule that “deems” another bill enacted should be constitutionally 
impermissible.
24
 
From a functionalist perspective, on the other hand, a single vote could 
advance an infinite number of bills, so long as the bill serving as the 
legislative train’s engine receives majority support, the members are clear 
on the precise effects of the vote, and a majority agrees by special rule to 
permit a single floor vote with multiple legislative effects. In other words, 
no serious constitutional objection exists provided that all the members are 
clear on the legislative outcome of a positive vote because each house has 
a constitutional mandate to establish its own internal operating 
procedures.
25
 
The use of deem-and-pass special rules obviously presents a serious 
and difficult question of constitutional law: May a single floor vote in 
either house of Congress have multiple legislative effects that advance 
entirely separate bills simultaneously? The Constitution plainly requires 
that both houses of Congress must “pass” a bill in order for it to become a 
law,
26
 but does this bicameralism requirement, set forth in Article I, 
Section 7, encompass a duty on the part of both houses to take the exact 
same vote?  
In the end, and despite the importance and centrality of this question, 
the federal courts might well decline to reach the merits of a challenge to 
the deem-and-pass procedure—save perhaps in the case of a presidential 
veto override vote.
27
 Even so, consideration of the constitutional status of 
the deem-and-pass procedure is important because it demonstrates that in 
matters of constitutional law we often know a great deal less than we think 
we know. Furthermore, both Congress and the President may someday 
need to consider not merely the political implications of the deem-and-
pass procedure, but also its constitutional status, when deciding whether to 
embrace its use in the federal legislative process. 
This Article considers these questions in some detail over the next six 
parts. Part II examines the use of special rules, including the deem-and-
pass special rule, in the House of Representatives.
28
 Part III analyzes the 
Constitution’s text with respect to the enactment of bills, the ratification of 
 
 
 24. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 34–73 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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treaties, and the override of presidential vetoes.
29
 Part IV undertakes a 
review of the legislative history of the Constitution in general, and Article 
I’s provisions on the enactment of laws in particular, to determine whether 
the Framers expressed any clear intention regarding whether each house of 
Congress must take an identical vote, rather than simply adopt the same 
text via non-mirror image votes.
30
 Part V offers an analysis and critique of 
the House’s use of the deem-and-pass procedure from both formalist and 
functionalist perspectives.
31
 Part VI considers whether the federal courts 
would be willing to reach the merits of a constitutional challenge to the 
House’s use of deem-and-pass special rules to enact bills only by 
implication rather than directly.
32
 Finally, Part VII briefly concludes and 
summarizes my argument.
33
 
Because the use of the deem-and-pass maneuver significantly 
diminishes accountability and transparency, and also undermines the 
importance of the bicameralism requirement, the practice should not be 
used to advance multiple separate bills through a single floor vote. 
Moreover, the question of what the Constitution requires for both houses 
of Congress to pass a bill should constitute a justiciable question, although 
this proposition is arguably stronger in contexts involving the use of 
deeming to override a presidential veto or to ratify a treaty. 
II. SPECIAL RULES, SELF-EXECUTING RULES, AND THE DEEM-AND-PASS 
PROCEDURE 
Since the New Deal era, the House of Representatives has used a 
variety of “special rules” designed to facilitate or expedite the legislative 
process. A “special rule” refers to a rule that waives or alters the 
legislative procedures on the floor of the House with respect to a particular 
bill or resolution, thereby departing from the “regular order.”34 Deem-and-
pass rules originated in the 1930s
35
 (the same time that Congress devised 
 
 
 29. See infra notes 74–96 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 98–143 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 148–91 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 192–244 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 245–47 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra note 37; see also Norman J. Ornstein, Hypocrisy: A Parliamentary Procedure, AM. 
ENTER. INST.: THE ENTER. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010, 4:24 PM), http://blog.american.com/?p=11467 
(discussing special rules, including deem and pass rules, and expressing a general preference for the 
regular order, or default rules of the House). 
 35. The first use of a “deeming” maneuver took place in 1933 and was used to raise the national 
debt ceiling—a vote that was necessary but politically unpopular with many members of the House 
Democratic caucus. See Ryan Grim, House Has Long History of Political Cowardice, Prolific Use of 
‘Deeming Resolutions’, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
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the legislative veto)
36
 and the procedure has been used hundreds of times 
over the past eighty years by the leadership of both political parties.
37
 
Thus, deem-and-pass rules enjoy a reasonably long and non-partisan 
historical imprimatur. Nor has the procedure ever been successfully 
challenged in federal court.
38
 Myriad forms of special rules exist, 
including “deem-and-pass,” but also including “king-of-the-mountain” 
special rules.
39
 
 
 
2010/03/16/house-has-long-history-of_n_500623.html. Grim notes that “[t]he first time that the 
chamber used what’s known as a ‘deeming resolution’—the mechanism Democrats are leaning toward 
using to pass the Senate health care bill through the House—was March 16, 1933.” Id. The special 
rule, set forth in House Resolution 63, provided “Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of 
this resolution the bill H.R. 2820, with Senate amendments thereto, be, and the same hereby is, taken 
from the Speaker’s table to the end that all Senate amendments be, and the same are hereby, agreed 
to.” H. Res. 63, 73d Cong. (Mar. 16, 1933). For a transcript of the debate associated with this first use 
of the deem-and-pass special rule, see Jordan Fabian, Rules Committee claims precedent for ‘deem and 
pass’ plan, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/ 
86987-rules-committee-claims-precedent-for-deem-and-pass-plan, (publishing in full a House Rules 
Committee staff memorandum released to the media that reprints both the full text of H.R. Res. 63 and 
also a transcript of the debate arising over it on the House floor). 
 36. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968–974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
 37. See David Dayen, Constitutional Questions Arise From “Deeming” Strategy, FIREDOGLAKE, 
(Mar. 16, 2010, 6:54 AM) http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/03/16/constitutional-questions-arise-from-
deeming-strategy/ (“Not only have Republican leaders said they cannot actually stop the House from 
advancing in this manner if they have the votes, but when they were in the majority, they used ‘self-
executing rules,’ which is the procedural way in which this process works, over and over again, 
hundreds of times in fact over a 12-year period.”); Tory Newmyer, Pelosi Defends Deem-and-Pass 
Tactic, ROLL CALL (Mar. 18, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-44357-1.html (quoting 
then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) as stating that the deem-and-pass special rule “has been 
used hundreds of times” by the House); see also WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
“SELF-EXECUTING” RULES REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES, CRS-1–2 (Dec. 21, 
2006) (discussing the development and use of the special self-executing rules to “deem-and-pass” 
bills). 
 38. Whether a federal court would find the constitutionality of a deem-and-pass special rule 
justiciable presents a difficult question. Arguably, the federal courts might decline to answer the 
question either on political question grounds or under the enrolled bill doctrine. See infra notes 197–
204 and accompanying text; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1351–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (applying the enrolled bill doctrine in support of decision to dismiss a case challenging the 
validity of a congressional enactment on political question grounds, thereby sustaining the validity of 
the statute over Public Citizen’s objection to its manner of enactment). 
 39. This is a particularly clever—and objectionable—kind of special rule. Under a “king-of-the-
mountain” (or “king-of-the-hill”) rule, the House will take recorded floor votes on a series of 
amendments to a pending bill, but only the last enacted amendment will actually be incorporated. See 
Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1018. This allows members to vote in favor of, and seemingly 
adopt, amendments that the House leadership dislikes, putting members on the record as having 
supported a particular amendment. Because only the last amendment to carry a majority actually gets 
incorporated into the bill, however, the votes are really a meaningless form of political theater, meant 
to obfuscate accountability for final content of the bill that might be objectionable to particular 
constituencies. A member could truthfully state “we amended the bill to address ‘x’,” but the 
amendment will be ineffectual unless it is the very last to garner a majority. Of course, the House 
leadership sequences the amendments to ensure that the last enacted amendment is unobjectionable to 
the House majority’s leadership. See id. (“The [Rules] Committee members strategically place 
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A special rule generally defines what amendments, if any, will be in 
order on the floor and also can specify what particular legislative effects 
either passage of the special rule or another piece of legislation will have. 
Strictly speaking, a rule providing for the enactment of another bill or the 
incorporation of an amendment without committee action or a floor vote 
constitutes a species of a “self-executing rule.”40 
A Congressional Research Service report explains that: 
One of the newer types [of special rules] is called a “self-executing” 
rule; it embodies a “two-for-one” procedure. This means that when 
the House adopts a rule it also simultaneously agrees to dispose of a 
separate matter, which is specified in the rule itself. For instance, 
self-executing rules may stipulate that a discrete policy proposal is 
deemed to have passed the House and been incorporated in the bill 
to be taken up. The effect: neither in the House nor in the 
Committee of the Whole will lawmakers have an opportunity to 
amend or vote separately on the “self-executed” provision. It was 
automatically agreed to when the House passed the rule.
41
 
Most commonly, the Rules Committee proposes a self-executing rule to 
dispose summarily of Senate amendments to an earlier House-passed 
bill.
42
 However, there is nothing in the House rules that would prevent the 
use of a self-executing rule to “deem passed” an entirely independent 
piece of legislation rather than to incorporate amendments into a pending 
bill.
43
 
Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explains that 
self-executing rules “provide that the House—upon adoption of the special 
rule—is considered or ‘deemed’ to have taken some other action as 
well.”44 Moreover, the “deeming” function, under the terms of a rule, 
could be tied either to adoption of the rule itself or to the subsequent vote 
 
 
amendments that are popular with constituents who oppose the party’s choice of ultimate legislation” 
and, accordingly, “members wishing to take a position to please their constituents can vote exuberantly 
in favor of as many amendments as they like.”). A better moniker for this kind of special rule would be 
the “musical chair rule,” in that only the last amendment seated wins. 
 40. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE 
RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 823–27, 857–58, 866–67 (2003) [hereinafter 
“HOUSE PRACTICE”]. Obviously, the use of a special self-executing rule to amend a single bill presents 
a much different—and easier—question than the use of this device to enact multiple, entirely separate 
bills through a single floor vote. 
 41. OLESZEK, supra note 37, at CRS-1. 
 42. See id. at CRS-2. 
 43. See Sarah A. Binder, A Primer on Self-Executing Rules, UP FRONT BLOG (Mar. 17, 2010, 
4:09 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0317_rules_binder.aspx. 
 44. Id. 
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on the bill the rule addresses. Thus, the passage of a bill by deeming 
would not necessarily have to be a function of enactment of the special 
rule but could instead relate to the vote on the main bill to which the 
special rule relates.
45
 
To adopt a special rule, however, the House must adopt the report of 
the Rules Committee that pertains to a specific bill.
46
 Accordingly, there 
must always be at least two floor votes: a vote on the special rule, and a 
subsequent vote on the substantive legislation itself.
47
 As House Practice 
observes: 
A resolution that specifies the manner in which a measure is to be 
taken up and the procedures to be followed during its consideration 
is called a “special order of business” or “special rule.” Such a 
resolution, once adopted by the House, gives privilege to the 
measure to be considered. . . . By adoption of a special order by 
majority vote, the House establishes the parameters of its agenda on 
an ad hoc basis.
48
 
The Rules Committee enjoys broad discretion to use its authority to 
establish a special rule for consideration of a particular bill. “The privilege 
of the Committee on Rules to report special orders of business extends to 
special orders for the consideration of individual bills or classes of bills or 
the consideration of a specified amendment to a bill and the prescription of 
 
 
 45. See id. Binder notes that “[o]ne form of this deeming provision could provide that when the 
House votes to approve the special rule for the reconciliation bill (or, alternatively, when the House 
votes to pass the reconciliation bill), the House is simultaneously considered to have voted for and 
passed the Senate-passed health care overhaul.” Id. 
 46. HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 827 (“The House may adopt a special rule from the 
Committee on Rules that has the effect of setting aside the standing rules of the House insofar as they 
impede the consideration of a particular bill.”). Most commonly, a special rule establishes the terms of 
debate, determines which amendments, if any, may be presented on the floor, and waives any potential 
points of order that might be used to delay or prevent House action on the bill. A “self-executing rule,” 
for example, which includes “deem and pass” rules, “is not subject to a point of order that the 
amendment would otherwise be subject to because the amendment is not separately before the House 
during consideration of the special order.” Id. 
 47. See OLESZEK, supra note 37, at CRS-1–2 (“This means that when the House adopts a rule it 
also simultaneously agrees to dispose of a separate matter, which is specified in the rule itself.”); 
Kenneth W. Smith, Jr., Understanding the self-executing rule, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2010, 10:33 AM, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/understanding-the-self-executi.html (noting that 
“lawmakers have no opportunity to amend or vote separately on the self-executed provision” and that 
this unrelated provision will be “automatically agreed to upon passage of a related measure”); see also 
Don Wolfensberger, House Executes Deliberation With Special Rules, ROLL CALL (June 19, 2006, 
12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/51_139/-13866-1.html (describing the mechanics and 
frequency of the use of self-executing deem and pass rules); HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 860–
61 (same). 
 48. HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 857 (emphasis added). 
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a mode of considering such amendment.”49 The only real restriction on the 
Rules Committee is the necessity of securing enactment of the special rule 
by the House; a special rule can exist only if the House itself votes to 
adopt it. 
The Rules Committee uses a special, self-executing rule most 
commonly to secure agreement to Senate amendments to a House-passed 
bill. This device permits the House to avoid committing the amended bill 
to a House committee of jurisdiction and also obviates the need for a floor 
vote on the amendment or amendments: 
The Committee on Rules may recommend a “hereby” resolution 
that provides for a concurrent resolution correcting the enrollment 
of a bill to be considered as adopted by the House upon adoption of 
the special order. Similarly, it may provide that a Senate 
amendment pending at the Speaker’s table and otherwise requiring 
consideration in Committee of the Whole be “hereby” considered as 
adopted upon adoption of the special order or considered as adopted 
with a further specified amendment.
50
 
Although “at one time the Rules Committee used self-executing 
amendments only for making technical changes, the Rules Committee 
increasingly uses such amendments to make substantive changes in bills 
without subjecting the changes to separate debate and votes.”51 This 
approach makes great sense if the House wishes to concur with Senate 
amendments and simply debate and vote directly on the Senate-enacted 
version of a pending bill. The Senate amendments are “deemed passed” 
and the House considers the Senate version of the bill directly, rather than 
taking separate votes on amendments or sending the bill to a joint 
conference committee for the purpose of writing a blended bill. 
House rules clearly permit the use of a special rule to do more than 
merely amend a pending bill.
52
 The device, simply put, provides a means 
to “hook-up” otherwise independent legislative measures—bills that 
otherwise would require independent, separate floor consideration—
including measures to incorporate amendments and to enact other free-
standing pieces of legislation.
53
 For better or worse, House practice 
 
 
 49. Id. at 859. 
 50. Id.; see also Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 18, at 358 (“Even more frequently, the 
Rules Committee introduces into the base text of a rule a self-executing further amendment; by 
adopting the rule, the House also adopts the amendment to the bill.”). 
 51. Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 18, at 358. 
 52. HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 859–60. 
 53. See id. at 859–61. 
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permits the use of a self-executing rule that “consider[s] as adopted” either 
an amendment or an entirely different bill.
54
 
For example, in the context of the 2010 health reform legislation, the 
most likely form of a deem-and-pass special rule would have made the 
vote on the amendments package—rather than the rule itself—the act that 
“deemed passed” the Senate version of the bill. Thus, if the special rule 
had carried at step one, a subsequent vote on the House amendments bill 
would also have the legislative effect of “deeming passed” the entirely 
separate Senate version of the health care bill. As a matter of metaphysics, 
at the instant the Speaker gaveled to a close the vote on the House 
amendments bill and declared it passed, the Senate bill would 
simultaneously be “deemed” enacted as well. In effect, a single floor vote 
would have two entirely separate legislative effects: a majority vote would 
enact both x and y, rather than simply x or y. 
A special deem-and-pass rule may have the effect of linking unrelated 
pieces of legislation for the purpose of a single floor vote. In theory the 
House Democratic leadership could have made House passage of the 
Rules Committee resolution the vote that “deemed passed” the Senate 
version of the health care reform bill. But, linking the passage of the 
Senate bill to the floor vote on the substantive House amendments bill, 
rather than to the Rules resolution, would benefit the majority party’s 
members by avoiding the possibility that the Senate bill might pass while 
the House amendments bill fails. 
At all points in time, however, the House members are cognizant of the 
effect of a particular floor vote. If a special rule itself has a “deem-and-
pass” clause or establishes that a subsequent positive floor vote “deems” 
another bill or an amendment to be passed, all members of the House of 
Representatives have clear notice of the precise effect of a vote on both the 
rule and also the substantive bill. Accountability, then, is not really 
diminished in the House of Representatives, and an interested constituent 
could ascertain precisely what proposition her member of Congress 
supported on the floor of the House. 
Moreover, there is, at least in theory, no restriction on the number of 
legislative effects that could be linked together via a deem-and-pass 
special rule. The House could enact multiple Senate bills, advance 
multiple independent bills to the Senate, and perhaps even override a 
presidential veto with two votes: one on a special rule that specifies how 
the deem-and-pass will work and a second on the “engine” measure that 
 
 
 54. See id. at 868. 
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will trigger the deem-and-pass effects. This assumes, of course, that the 
deem-and-pass linkage uses the substantive bill, rather than the special 
rule itself, to work its legislative magic. A successful linkage simply 
requires specification that enactment of either the special rule itself or 
subsequent House enactment of the bill the special rule addresses will 
have the additional effect of also enacting other bills or overriding a 
presidential veto (or vetoes) concurrently. 
In recent times, the House leadership, under both parties, has been 
using special rules with more frequency and greater creativity in order to 
control and shape the legislative process. Walter Oleszak explains that 
“[s]tarting about twenty-five years ago, in response to developments such 
as increased partisanship and uncertainty with respect to how long or 
controversial the amendment process on the floor might be, the Rules 
Committee began to issue more procedurally imaginative and complex 
rules.”55 Jess Bravin adds that “[b]oth parties have used deeming many 
times dating back to at least 1933,”56 and have used a special, self-
executing rule to secure passage of major legislation. For example, 
“[u]nder Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich, the House used it to pass a 
bill in 1996 that gave the president line-item veto power over the federal 
budget.”57 The House also has used this procedure “to pass such 
legislation as the smoking ban on domestic airline flights, an employment 
verification system meant to screen out illegal immigrants and a ban on 
using statistical sampling for the 2000 census.”58 
Moreover, such self-executing rules have been used dozens of times in 
recent sessions of Congress.
59
 The House has even used self-executing 
rules to enact major legislation. As Binder observes, “perhaps the most 
 
 
 55. OLESZEK, supra note 37, at CRS-1. 
 56. Bravin, supra note 1, at A4. 
 57. Id. For the substantive legislation at issue and subsequent litigation over its constitutional 
validity, see Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 691 et seq. (1996)) and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420–21 (1998). The Supreme 
Court invalidated this statute because “[i]n both legal and practical effect,” it permitted the President to 
amend laws without recourse to the bicameral enactment of a bill. See Clinton, 524 U.S.at 438–47. 
 58. Matt Kelley, Expert: Pelosi ‘Deem and Pass’ Strategy for Health Care Is Not Unusual, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 15, 2010, at A4, available at http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/ 
2010/03/expert-pelosi-deem-and-pass-strategy-for-health-care-is-not-unusual/1 (quoting Brookings 
Institute Fellow Thomas Mann); see also OLESZEK, supra note 37, at CRS-2 (listing examples of 
major bills enacted pursuant to a self-executing rule in the House). 
 59. Kelley, supra note 58, at A4 (reporting that Congress used the procedure “36 times in 2005 
and 2006, when the GOP was in charge, and 49 times in 2007 and 2008, after the Democrats had taken 
control”); see Ornstein, supra note 34 (noting that the House Republican Party leadership repeatedly 
used self-executing rules when they enjoyed a majority from 1995 to 2007 and asking “is there no 
shame anymore?”). Ornstein, a prolific and well-regarded scholar of Congress, notes, however, that “I 
don’t like self-executing rules by either party—I prefer the ‘regular order.’” Id. 
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salient use of self-executing rules—reaching back to 1979—allows the 
House to avoid casting a direct vote on raising the federal debt limit.”60 
She persuasively observes that “[i]t is hard to argue that there’s any 
measure more central to the functioning of the nation than its ability to 
issue debt.”61 
One might ask, why would the House use a special rule to enact either 
amendments or a major piece of legislation? The answer is obvious: these 
devices permit a member to go on the record on a given question (even if 
the final bill does not incorporate the member’s proposed amendment) or 
avoid going on the record, at least nominally, with respect to an unpopular 
bill. Consider, for example, a “king-of-the-hill” self-executing rule. Brown 
and Johnson explain, 
Although regular order does not permit further amendments to a 
text once it has been amended in its entirety, a “king-of-the-hill” 
rule permits several substitute amendments to be voted on in the 
Committee of the Whole, with only the last one adopted to be 
considered as finally adopted and reported to the House. This 
procedure permits consideration of conflicting amendments in a 
series, with only the one winning the most votes being finally voted 
on in the House.
62
 
Professors Frymer and Yoon report that normally “only the last 
successful amendment passed becomes part of the legislation” as opposed 
to the amendment winning the most votes.
63
 The purpose of this 
parliamentary stratagem is to make it easier for members to defend their 
final vote before their constituents: “After a series of extreme stances, it 
becomes easier for members to defend themselves to their constituents—
they are only one of 435 people; they voted in correspondence with 
constituency interests as much as possible; but in the end, they accepted 
the ‘compromise’ to avoid a potentially worse outcome.”64 Professors 
Frymer and Yoon go on to explain that “‘[s]elf-executing’ rules have a 
similar ability to insulate members from controversial decisions.”65 They 
observe that “the party leadership wants to find a way to structure the 
choices offered to its members on the House floor so that members can 
 
 
 60. Binder, supra note 43, at 4. 
 61. Id. 
 62. HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 868. 
 63. Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1018. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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vote with the party without deeply offending their constituents, and, if 
constituents are offended, to cover up their own involvement in the 
legislation’s passage.”66 Hardly the stuff of Profiles in Courage,67 to be 
sure. The device exists to try to obfuscate—or avoid entirely—hard votes 
for legislation that will likely prove noxious to a member’s constituents. 
It is patently obvious that the motive for at least some special rules is 
highly questionable. The self-executing rule renders political 
accountability for unpopular votes more difficult, and the “king-of-the-
hill” special rule permits a member to take false credit for an 
unincorporated substitute version of a bill. Both rules facilitate politically 
useful “position taking” that can enhance the member’s prospects for 
reelection.
68
 The idea is that by staking out positions, rather than actually 
making decisions, the member satisfies the policy demands of her 
constituency without actually breaking from the leadership. As Mayhew 
puts it, “The electoral requirement is not that [s]he make pleasing things 
happen but that [s]he make pleasing judgmental statements.”69 
Does the use of a self-executing rule really work to insulate members 
from political accountability for the net effects of their floor vote on the 
main bill? Brookings Institute Senior Fellow Sarah Binder is highly 
dubious, observing that she “would hazard [that] most close observers 
doubt that it will make a difference to voters whether Democrats explicitly 
voted for the Senate-passed [health care reform] bill or voted for a 
procedure that allowed it to be passed.”70 Even so, “legislators sure think it 
matters” because use of the deem-and-pass procedure “offers a method of 
avoiding blame should they be attacked come election time for their 
votes.”71 Thus, Frymer and Yoon have observed that the game afoot 
involves the House Rules Committee “cleverly . . . devis[ing] procedures 
that allow members to support the party leadership while at the same time 
appealing to their districts through various complex and restrictive 
rules.”72 
 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1st ed. 1956) (recounting the stories of U.S. 
public officials who exemplified the virtues of courage and integrity while in office, public servants 
who subordinated their own short term political and personal interests to advance causes and principles 
more important than their own political careers). 
 68. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (1974). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Binder, supra note 43, at 5. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1017. 
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To date, the rules of the Senate do not include the use of the deem-and-
pass special rule. However, if the Constitution permits its use by the 
House, the Senate could certainly decide to adopt the procedure at some 
future point in time. Were the Senate to use the deem-and-pass procedure, 
the accountability problem associated with its use by the House would be 
greatly exacerbated.
73
 
Regardless of the efficacy of the House’s use of special rules as a 
means of either avoiding a hard vote or going on the record for a bill that 
everyone knows will not receive a final floor vote, a larger question 
remains, particularly with respect to the use of a special rule to vest a 
single floor vote with multiple, perhaps wholly unrelated, legislative 
effects: Does the Constitution permit a single vote, or even a pair of floor 
votes, to advance a potentially infinite number of separate bills? The 
question of the constitutional status of the deem-and-pass procedure 
should be considered independently of its political morality or political 
expediency. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND THE ENACTMENT OF BILLS 
Despite the fundamental importance of how Congress operates, the 
Constitution provides precious little detail about the operation of each 
house of Congress or the potential effect of a single floor vote (or pair of 
votes) in particular. One would think that the Framers would have 
carefully delineated the steps necessary to enact a law, including the 
procedural steps and substantive effect of a floor vote in either chamber. 
Surprisingly, the Constitution’s text is entirely silent on these questions. 
To be sure, the Constitution does establish a few procedural 
requirements for the enactment of a law or ratification of a treaty. In 
particular, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 provides that: 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if 
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on 
their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the 
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
 
 
 73. See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text. 
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by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such 
Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and 
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill 
shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any 
Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall 
be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress 
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not 
be a Law.
74
 
This clause plainly requires bicameral enactment and presentment to the 
President,
75
 but it does not specify whether a single vote of either House 
may advance more than one bill at a time. The relevant operative 
language—“shall have passed”—simply does not define what “passed” 
means. Thus, Article I, Section 7’s literal language does not specify any 
particular rules for the consideration of pending legislation, nor does it 
explicitly require that a single floor vote have only one legislative effect or 
that both houses of Congress vote on precisely the same question when 
enacting a bill. 
In one context, the Constitution does provide particularized procedures. 
Article I, Section 7, provides very specific procedures governing the 
overriding of a presidential veto: 
But in all such Cases [of veto override votes] the Votes of both 
Houses shall be determined by the yeas and Nays, and the Names of 
the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the 
Journal of each House respectively.
76
 
This provision requires a recorded vote by name. Normally, the 
Constitution requires recorded votes only if at least one-fifth of the 
members present and voting request a recorded vote on any question 
pending before the body.
77
 Thus, the veto override provisions require a 
recorded vote that facilitates political accountability. A veto cannot be 
sustained or overridden on a voice vote, which means that each member 
 
 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. On the origins and meaning of the “Sundays excepted” 
language, see Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 ALA. L. REV. 507 (2008). 
 75. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the 
Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of 
those Present, be entered on the Journal.”). 
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must publicly declare her position on the question at issue if she elects to 
vote. 
Moreover, the legislative history of the Constitution demonstrates that 
the Framers considered, but expressly rejected, a lower threshold for 
requiring votes to be recorded in either house of Congress.
78
 The delegates 
at the Federal Convention feared that the ability to demand a recorded vote 
with less than 20 percent of the voting members would invite procedural 
shenanigans that would disrupt the operation of the House and Senate.
79
 In 
the case of a presidential veto, however, the delegates believed that it was 
important to force a public vote on the question of an override and 
required a recorded vote as a condition of a valid veto override.
80
 
Perhaps more important, the text of Article I, Section 7 specifies that 
“[i]f after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to 
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two 
thirds of that House it shall become a Law.”81 The precise language used, 
“the bill,” as well as the consistent use of a singular pronoun (viz., “it”), 
seems to bespeak that only the vetoed bill will be pending before the 
House during the veto override proceeding. 
By way of contrast, the constitutional language creating the 
bicameralism requirement provides that “[e]very Bill which shall have 
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it 
become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.”82 
Rather than “a bill” or “the bill,” the Framers wrote the bicameralism 
requirement in vaguer terms than the veto override procedure rules. This 
nomenclature lends further support to a constitutional requirement that a 
 
 
 78. The delegates considered, but rejected, permitting a single member of either house to demand 
a recorded vote on any question pending before the chamber. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 255–56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter “2 Farrand”]. They rejected 
this rule, in favor of the 20 percent requirement, because they feared that a rule permitting any member 
to demand a recorded vote would inevitably be abused to slow down legislative proceedings by 
minority party members. See id. 
 79. See id. at 255 (“Mr Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to call 
the yeas and nays, and recited the abuses of it, in Massts,” which included “stuffing the journals with 
them on frivolous occasions” and “misleading the people who never know the reasons determining the 
votes.”). 
 80. See id. at 161–62 (presenting an early draft of the Constitution from the Committee of Detail 
that require[d] a recorded vote whenever a house of Congress takes a vote to override a presidential 
veto). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The same exact language also appears later in 
the veto override procedural rules: “the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be 
entered on the Journal of each House respectively.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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veto override vote be limited solely to the question of sustaining or 
overriding the President’s veto of a single bill. 
Thus, one could infer from the text of Article I, Section 7 that a straight 
up or down vote should be required on at least the override question. 
Because the Constitution provides such specific rules governing override 
proceedings, it would be something of a stretch to suggest that a vote on 
an unrelated bill, even if recorded, would satisfy the requirements of 
Article I, Section 7. When a President exercises a veto and Congress 
wishes to override that decision, it must observe specific procedures, and 
these procedures do not permit the override vote to include extraneous 
legislative business unrelated to the up-or-down vote on sustaining or 
overturning the veto. Given the specificity of the procedures for a veto 
override vote, it would be very odd to say that the House could employ a 
special rule to piggy-back other legislation on a floor vote to override a 
presidential veto. 
Presumably the House could not amend a vetoed bill before voting on 
whether to override the veto—even incident to a special rule governing the 
veto override proceeding on the floor. The amendment itself would trigger 
the requirement of bicameral enactment and presentment to the President 
for signature or veto.
83
 To yoke another bill, or any other legislative 
measure, to a veto override vote would be to deny the President a full, fair, 
and clean consideration of his reasons for rejecting the bill. It also would 
undermine the practical and political utility of the recorded vote 
requirement. A member could say “I voted for the override measure in 
order to advance another bill, not because I rejected the President’s 
position on the vetoed bill,” thereby denying the President, and the 
member’s constituents, the ability to hold that member of Congress 
politically accountable for opposing the President’s position. So too, using 
a veto override to achieve unrelated legislative effects would not really 
constitute a vote on “the Bill.” Considering unrelated questions when 
voting on a motion to override a presidential veto means that House 
members are not simply voting on the vetoed bill, but rather on the vetoed 
bill and something else; this would deny the President the full benefit of 
the procedural protections, including enhanced accountability and 
transparency for override votes, that the Framers intended to provide both 
the President and the citizenry who elect members of Congress. 
Consistent with this analysis, I could not find any instance of a special 
rule being used to “deem and override” a presidential veto or a veto 
 
 
 83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). 
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override vote being used to advance unrelated bills. Instead, the historical 
practice of the House of Representatives has been to hold clean votes on 
overriding a presidential veto when the only question pending before the 
chamber is whether to enact the bill into law notwithstanding the 
President’s exercise of a veto. Of course, the fact that the House has not 
yet used a special rule in the context of a veto override vote does not mean 
that the House would never attempt such a legislative maneuver. The 
validity of the special rule procedure is an important question not only 
with respect to past practice, but also with respect to future legislative 
practice. Given the House’s present practice, however, the Constitution 
answers a question that the House of Representatives has not yet sought to 
ask. 
The treaty power also merits brief mention. As with a presidential veto, 
the Constitution expressly provides a procedure for ratification of a treaty. 
More specifically, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 states that the President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”84 
Thus, the President has the sole power to negotiate and conclude treaties, 
but for a treaty to be ratified, the Senate must approve the treaty by a two-
thirds majority vote, with a quorum present.
85
 As in the case of a veto 
override, strong arguments exist that the Constitution should be 
understood to require that the Senate afford a treaty a clean vote.
86
 This is 
especially true given the diplomatic implications of the Senate refusing to 
ratify a treaty signed by the President or—and arguably worse—ratifying a 
treaty without careful and sober consideration. It would be particularly 
objectionable for the Senate to approve a treaty using a deem-and-pass 
maneuver because the treaty power may be used to expand the scope of 
 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 85. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920) (sustaining treaty over 
Tenth Amendment objection); Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600–601 (1912) 
(outlining the constitutional requirements for valid adoption of a treaty); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S. 304, 356–62 (1816) (holding that a validly enacted treaty preempts conflicting state law); 
Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 626–28 (1813) (same). 
 86. It bears noting that Article II, § 2 indicates that two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate is 
sufficient to consider ratification of a treaty, as opposed to an absolute two-thirds requirement of the 
entire body. The text specifies that two-thirds “of the Senators present” must concur in ratifying a 
treaty; the clear implication of the word “present” in this context is to resolve a potential ambiguity 
that might otherwise exist if the text simply provided that “two thirds of the members of the Senate 
concur.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The alternative formulation, omitting the 
modifier “present,” would leave open the question of whether the two-thirds requirement applies to the 
whole membership of the Senate or, rather, to merely a quorum of the body. The drafters plainly 
believed that, given the importance of ratifying or refusing to ratify a treaty, the two-thirds requirement 
might be read to require two-thirds of the full membership. 
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federal power beyond the four corners of Article I, Section 8.
87
 Because 
treaties can arguably extend the scope of federal authority thereby 
preempting pre-existing residual state authority,
88
 such decisions should be 
made only through a clean up or down vote on ratification. 
To be clear, I do not argue that the Senate has any absolute duty to vote 
on all treaties submitted by the President for ratification. I argue only that 
the presence of a specific procedure for the ratification of a treaty arguably 
should be read to limit the Senate’s power to use its general authority 
under Article I, Section 5 to make and enforce rules of procedure to 
govern its own operations. The Senate remains free to vote, or not vote, on 
a treaty submitted by the President for a good reason, a bad reason, or no 
reason at all. 
Although the deem-and-pass question cannot arise in this context, 
because the House of Representatives has no role in the ratification of a 
treaty and the Senate does not currently use the deem-and-pass procedure, 
the text of Article II is important in contextualizing the use of special 
rules. I would argue that the treaty ratification procedure specified in 
Article II should be understood to preclude a deem-and-pass procedure 
 
 
 87. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (“It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest 
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty 
followed by such an act could [constitutionally address].”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4–5, at 227 (2d ed. 1988) (“Missouri v. Holland thus views the treaty power 
as a delegation of authority to federal treaty-makers independent of the delegations embodied in the 
enumeration of Congress’s own powers.”). Of course, this power to establish new federal authority by 
virtue of a ratified treaty does not and arguably cannot extend to the repeal or abridgement of rights 
secured by the Constitution and its amendments, notably including the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (opining that international 
agreements, including both treaties and executive agreements, cannot “confer power on the Congress, 
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution”). 
 88. Under the Constitution, treaties constitute “the supreme Law of the Land.” See U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” (emphasis added)). The effect 
of this rule, when coupled with Missouri v. Holland’s expansive construction of the scope of the treaty 
power, means that if the President and two-thirds of the Senate agree, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, 
it is possible to displace the traditional role of the states over any matter not expressly protected by an 
individual right. For example, a treaty, at least in theory, could extend plenary federal authority over 
the structure of local governments, family law, or other matters traditionally thought to reside squarely 
within the reserved police powers of the states. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee provides an excellent 
example: a treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom had the effect of entirely 
displacing Virginia’s common law of property with respect to the vesting of fee simple absolute title in 
a parcel of land. See Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 340–41 (holding that state judges, when deciding 
cases involving a conflict between a state law and a valid federal treaty, “were not to decide merely 
according to the laws or constitution of the state, but according to the constitution, laws and treaties of 
the United States—‘the supreme law of the land’”). 
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with respect to ratification votes, if the Senate were to adopt the practice at 
some point in the future. The Constitution’s specific provisions for 
ratification of a treaty arguably should be read as establishing the 
exclusive procedures for ratification. Moreover, the President deserves a 
straight up or down vote on the treaty itself given the potentially severe 
negative foreign relations implications of failing to ratify a pending treaty 
and the concomitant, structural changes that a ratified treaty can work in 
“Our Federalism.”89 This argument is, to be sure, as much functionalist as 
formalist because the text of the Constitution does not expressly require 
the Senate to afford proposed treaties a straight up or down vote on 
ratification.
90
 
 
 
 89. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971) (“It should never be forgotten 
that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a 
highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.”); id. at 44 (explaining that the concept of 
“Our Federalism” means “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State 
and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to 
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will 
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States”). The requirement that Congress speak 
with clarity when it seeks to apply general federal laws, often enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides an illustrative example of how careful enforcement of 
federalism principles could imply limits on the Senate’s voting procedures for treaties. See Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62, 467 (1991) (holding that if Congress wishes to apply a general federal 
commerce regulation to state government entities, it must include a plain statement of this intention 
and that, in the absence of such an express plain statement, federal courts should assume that Congress 
did not seek to subject state government entities to federal regulation). Justice O’Connor, writing for 
the Gregory majority, explained that “[t]his plain statement rule is nothing more than an 
acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, 
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Id. at 461; see also id. at 470 (holding that 
“[i]n the face of [an] ambiguity, we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state 
governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause 
powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Thus, in some important ways, the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary approach to federalism questions could be characterized as “formalist” rather than 
“functionalist.” See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 90. Such a requirement is most logically derived from the implications of ratifying or rejecting a 
treaty (and particularly the potential effects on federalism and the residual police powers of the states). 
See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–07 (2012) (holding that 
Congress could not significantly alter the terms of states’ participation in the Medicaid program 
without offending the Tenth Amendment and the notion that states are not merely administrative 
appendages of the national government, and observing that the “threatened loss of over 10 percent of a 
State’s overall budget [constitutes] economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but 
to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69, 188 
(1992) (holding that Congress may not “commandeer” state legislatures by forcing them involuntarily 
to enact laws necessary to operationalize federal regulatory schemes and observing that “[s]tates are 
not mere political subdivisions of the United States”); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress may not simply 
“conscript state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic army”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1094 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1071 
 
 
 
 
The specific constitutional provisions governing the override of 
presidential vetoes and the ratification of treaties suggest that Congress 
may not use a special self-executing deem-and-pass rule to take extraneous 
actions unrelated to the vetoed bill or the pending treaty.
91
 But what about 
the constitutional status of using special, self-executing rules in other 
contexts to allow a single floor vote to advance multiple, independent 
bills? One must discern the precise meaning of “passing” a bill in the 
House or Senate in order to analyze the constitutionality of using self-
executing rules to achieve multiple, legislative effects via a single floor 
vote in these other, more quotidian contexts. 
James Madison feared that Congress might attempt to evade the 
presentment requirement by calling a bill something else. To avoid this, he 
successfully urged the delegates to adopt the rule reflected in Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the 
United States, and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be 
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by 
two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to 
the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.
92
 
This so-called “ORV” Clause prevents the use of creative nomenclature to 
avoid the presentment requirement. It does not, however, define what 
“passage” of a bill requires. The Constitution does define a “quorum” for 
 
 
Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1646–53 (2012) [hereinafter “The New Formalism”]. 
 91. In some respects, the veto override and, arguably, the treaty ratification procedures impose a 
kind of “single subject rule” in these specific contexts. See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace 
More Than One Subject”, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 389–91 (1958). The idea is that in order to secure 
political accountability for a veto override or ratification of a treaty, the members must vote on that 
question and only on that question. This approach prevents the harnessing of various minorities to 
support an omnibus measure that overrides a veto or ratifies a treaty—and also does enough additional 
unrelated things to secure the necessary votes to ensure passage of the motion. See Michael D. Gilbert, 
Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 811–15 (2006). This use of 
combining minorities to form a majority is called “logrolling” and has given rise to requirements that 
bills encompass only a single subject, as well as plain title requirements for bills. For a discussion of 
logrolling, the adoption of single subject rules as a response to it in the vast majority of the states, and 
its potential relevance to the use of special, self-executing rules, see infra notes 150–55 and 
accompanying text. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha 
Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1274–75, 1315–30 (2005) (discussing the legislative 
history and meaning of the “Orders, Resolution, or Vote” or “ORV” Clause). 
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the purpose of conducting business,
93
 but it simply does not provide any 
specific procedural rules for voting on pending legislation (save, as noted 
above, in the case of overriding a presidential veto). 
Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 provides language that could be relevant 
to defining the “passage” requirement: 
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of 
two thirds, expel a member.
94
 
This language would seem to empower either house to establish rules 
governing floor action and, arguably, to define for itself what “passage” 
means. 
As a general matter, then, the text of the Constitution does not directly 
speak to whether a single floor vote can advance multiple, separate bills at 
once under a special rule. A single floor vote could create five legislative 
effects. The House of Representatives could “pass” three Senate bills and 
send them to the White House while also “passing” two additional House 
bills headed for the Senate. Contrary to Professor McConnell’s claims,95 
there is no textual requirement that every bill receive its own floor vote 
within the four corners of the Constitution. 
There remains, of course, one final context in which the use of a deem-
and-pass rule might be constitutionally unobjectionable: to waive House 
rules that would otherwise require commitment of a bill to a committee or 
separate floor votes on a series of amendments to a House-initiated bill. It 
is difficult to see the harm in allowing the use of a special rule to waive 
internal House rules, perhaps to expedite consideration of a bill amended 
by the Senate. So long as the House actually takes a single vote on the 
same question as the Senate, no serious objection can exist to the use of 
the deem-and-pass procedure. Such use of a special deem-and-pass rule 
seems entirely within the residual authority of the House under Article I, 
Section 5, Clause 2 to establish—and presumably also to waive—its own 
internal rules of procedure. Because this particular use of a special, self-
executing rule does not entail the House and Senate voting on essentially 
 
 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“[A] Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to 
do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the 
Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may 
provide.”). 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 95. See McConnell, supra note 10. 
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different legislative questions, it should not be deemed a violation of 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2. 
Returning to the more problematic context of using a self-executing 
special rule to adopt more than one freestanding bill through a single floor 
vote, the fact that the Constitution’s text does not squarely disallow a 
procedure does not, of course, definitively resolve the question of that 
procedure’s constitutionality. The text of the Constitution does not 
prohibit appointing an infant to the Supreme Court or having a sitting U.S. 
Court of Appeals Judge concurrently serve as Director of the FBI. In other 
words, the absence of a textual prohibition represents the starting point of 
the argument, not the end. The U.S. legal system maintains a strong and 
well-defined constitutional common law,
96
 and other sources of authority 
might support a compelling argument that a single floor vote can only 
have a single legislative effect.
97
 
Outside the specific contexts of overriding a presidential veto and—
arguably—ratifying a treaty, the Constitution does not seem to require that 
either house of Congress maintain a rule that limits a single floor vote to 
passing a single pending bill. Accordingly, either house of Congress could 
adopt rules that permit a single vote to advance multiple bills either to the 
other house or to the President without transgressing a specific textual 
limitation on the federal legislative process. If any limits on permitting a 
single floor vote to pass multiple independent bills exist, these limits must 
arise from either the legislative history of the Constitution or structural 
considerations, rather than from the constitutional text itself. 
IV. THE FRAMERS, THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, AND THE PASSAGE OF 
BILLS 
If the Constitution’s text does not provide a clear answer to the 
question of whether the House may use a single floor vote to achieve 
multiple, legislative effects by a special self-executing rule, the legislative 
history of the Constitution might help to resolve the question. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court routinely has looked to the records of the Federal 
Convention and the ratification debate when determining the constitutional 
 
 
 96. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012) (noting that many important constitutional 
principles and limitations on government power arise from broader implications of the text, rather than 
directly from the text itself). 
 97. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or 
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994). 
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permissibility of a particular legislative innovation, such as the legislative 
veto
98
 or a statutory presidential line item veto.
99
 Constitutional silence 
when read against history, can yield a prohibition against a particular 
innovation in the federal legislative process when the legislative history of 
the Constitution supports recognition of an implied prohibition.
100
 
Unfortunately, the Framers did not devote much time or attention to the 
precise requirements of “passing” a bill in each house despite the 
question’s central importance. Both the records of the Federal Convention 
and the Federalist Papers shed remarkably little light on this question. 
The delegates in Philadelphia considered at length whether to vest the 
President alone with a veto power over legislation or, in the alternative, to 
vest the veto power in a “Council of Revision” that might include 
members of the President’s cabinet as well as members of the federal 
judiciary, including Justices of the Supreme Court.
101
 However, the 
delegates first had to decide a preliminary structural question: whether to 
have a unitary or plural executive.
102
 
After considerable debate, the delegates voted in favor of vesting the 
whole executive power in a single national executive officer on June 4, 
1787 by a margin of seven states to three.
103
 Even if the executive branch 
was to be led by a single executive officer, however, the question 
remained whether to vest a “revisionary” power over bills passed by both 
houses of Congress in the chief executive officer, the federal courts, or a 
“Council of Revision.” 
The delegates expressed myriad views about the wisdom of a Council 
of Revision. “Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] doubt[ed] whether the 
 
 
 98. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–51 (1983). 
 99. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–41 (1998). 
 100. See id. at 439 (“There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this 
profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition.”); see also Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 905, 933–35 (1997) (noting that “[b]ecause there is no constitutional text speaking to 
th[e] precise question” pending at bar, the Supreme Court must examine “historical understanding and 
practice, . . . the structure of the Constitution, and . . . the jurisprudence of this Court” to resolve the 
issue and, using this method of analysis, holding that well-settled principles of federalism preclude 
Congress from “commandeering” state executive officers to enforce federal law). 
 101. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97–98 (June 1, 1787) (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter “1 Farrand”]; id. at 138–40 (June 6, 1787); see also Randall, supra note 
74, at 512–13. 
 102. See 1 Farrand, supra note 101, at 65–75 (June 1, 1787); id. at 96–97 (June 4, 1787); see 
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993). 
 103. 1 Farrand, supra note 101, at 97 (June 4, 1787). Elbridge Gerry argued that a plural executive 
“[would] be a general with three heads” and “would be extremely inconvenient in many instances, 
particularly in military matters.” Id. 
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Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they [would] have [had] a sufficient 
check [against] encroachments on their own department by their 
exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their 
Constitutionality.”104 Along similar lines, delegate James Wilson, of 
Pennsylvania, argued that “[i]f the Legislative, [Executive], and Judiciary 
ought to be distinct [and] independent, The Executive ought to have an 
absolute negative.”105 Roger Sherman of the Connecticut delegation, on 
the other hand, “was [against] enabling any one man to stop the will of the 
whole.”106 And, Benjamin Franklin, in his capacity as a delegate from 
Pennsylvania, warned that “[t]he Executive will be always increasing here, 
as elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy.”107 
The delegates ultimately postponed deciding whether to adopt a 
Council of Revision by a vote of six states to four.
108
 The delegates soon 
thereafter voted against vesting the President with an absolute veto power, 
with no states in favor and ten against.
109
 Immediately following this 
second vote, Pierce Butler of South Carolina moved, and Benjamin 
Franklin seconded, a motion that the veto power be amended to constitute 
a power solely to suspend the effectiveness of a new law.
110
 This proposal 
was unanimously rejected.
111
 The delegates subsequently adopted a 
resolution permitting both houses of Congress, by a two thirds vote, “to 
overrule the revisionary check” and also adopted a resolution “which gave 
the Executive alone without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the 
laws.”112 
Undeterred by the convention’s failure to embrace the concept of a 
Council of Revision, James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, 
seconded by James Madison, proposed a resolution that the veto power be 
vested in the President “[and] a convenient number of the National 
Judiciary.”113 But, Alexander Hamilton objected to consideration of the 
motion, and deliberation on the motion was postponed.
114
 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 98. 
 106. 1 Farrand, supra note 101, at 99 (June 4, 1787). 
 107. Id. at 103. 
 108. Id. at 97. 
 109. Id. at 103. 
 110. 1 Farrand, supra note 78, at 103–04 (June 4, 1787). 
 111. Id. at 104 (June 4, 1787). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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On June 6, 1787, the delegates resumed consideration of Wilson’s 
motion.
115
 Madison, arguing in support of Wilson’s motion, suggested that 
the joint exercise of the veto power by the President and members of the 
federal judiciary would lend needed structural support to the President and 
executive branch.
116
 Debate was joined; for example, Rufus King, of 
Massachusetts, argued that “[i]f the Unity of the Executive was preferred 
for the sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the 
revisionary as to the Executive power.”117 Ultimately, “[o]n the question 
for joining the Judges to the Executive in the revisionary business,” the 
vote was three states for to eight against adopting Wilson’s proposed 
amendment.
118
 This vote also implicitly rejected the concept of creating a 
Council of Revision to share the “revisionary power,” or veto, with the 
President.
119
 
Undaunted, Wilson, seconded by Madison, again tried to seek 
amendment of the veto power to include members of the federal judiciary 
on July 21, 1787.
120
 Wilson argued that participation in a Council of 
Revision would involve exercise of a different power than that of 
constitutional review: “Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be 
dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to 
justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect.”121 He argued “Let them 
have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity 
of taking notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the 
weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.”122 After 
another extended debate, Wilson’s motion once again failed with a vote of 
three states in favor, four states against, and two state delegations 
divided.
123
 
The convention delegates also debated the veto override power. The 
convention initially set the threshold for overriding a presidential veto at 
 
 
 115. 1 Farrand, supra note 101, at 138 (June 6, 1787). 
 116. See id. at 138–39. 
 117. Id. at 139. 
 118. Id. at 140. 
 119. See James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Review, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 257 (1989). Barry provides an excellent overview of the philosophical and 
practical arguments for and against a Council of Revision, and an overview of such bodies in the 
British legal system, as well as in the colonial and early state governments. See id. at 237–48. 
 120. 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 73 (July 21, 1787). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 80. 
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two-thirds,
124
 then moved the margin to three-fourths,
125
 and finally reset 
the margin at two-thirds toward the very end of the meeting.
126
 
Madison also proposed that the veto power be exercised by the 
“Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments” jointly.127 Under 
Madison’s proposal, a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress 
could override a veto by either branch alone, but “if both should object, 
3/4 of each House, should be necessary to overrule the objections and give 
to the acts the force of law.”128 James Wilson seconded Madison’s 
proposed amendment to the working document, but the proposal failed by 
a margin of three to eight.
129
 
On the more specific question of permitting each house to establish 
their own rules of procedure, the language of Article I, Section 5, 
Clause 2
130
 appears in the draft document submitted to the delegates by the 
Committee of Detail.
131
 This draft also contains the language that sets 
forth the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
132
 The 
subsequent debates, however, never focused on the scope of the power to 
set internal procedures, the requirement of “passage” in each house, or 
limits on the use of this power to creatively define “passage” in ways that 
undermine the bicameralism requirement. In fact, the legislative history of 
the Federal Convention is entirely silent on both these points.
133
 
 
 
 124. 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 294–95 (Aug. 15, 1787). 
 125. Id. at 298, 301 (Aug. 15, 1787). 
 126. The delegates changed the override margin from three-fourth to two-thirds of a quorum on 
September 12, 1787. See 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 585–87 (Sept. 12, 1787). 
 127. Id. at 298 (Aug. 15, 1787). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 131. See 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 140–41, 158, 165 (Aug. 6, 1787). 
 132. See id. at 160–62, 167 (Aug. 6, 1787); see also Randall, supra note 74, at 512–13. 
 133. The delegates’ resounding silence on this question is certainly surprising. The closest 
relevant debate involved James Madison’s concern that Congress might attempt to avoid the obligation 
to present bills to the president by using creative nomenclature. See 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 301–
02 (Aug. 15, 1787). The convention delegates initially disregarded Madison’s concern on this front, 
see id. at 302, but agreed at the next day’s session to adopt language in the draft addressing Madison’s 
concern, see id. at 304–05 (Aug. 16, 1787). It is more than passing strange that protecting the 
presentment requirement generated both extensive debate and a significant modification of the 
Constitution’s text, but that protecting the integrity of the bicameralism requirement did not. Perhaps 
the notion that both houses of Congress would take the same vote incident to passing a bill was so self-
evident, in light of contemporary practice of the state legislatures at that time, that an express textual 
requirement of identical votes simply seemed neither necessary nor essential. Alternatively, perhaps 
the question of requiring an identical vote in both houses might not have arisen because the congress 
established under the Articles of Confederation consisted of only a single house—meaning that the 
problem of two houses voting on different propositions but still claiming to have enacted a bill simply 
could not have arisen. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1; id. at art. IX; see 
also The New Formalism, supra note 90, at 1627–28 n.146 (discussing the complete centrality of the 
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A significant debate arose on the question of whether to permit a single 
member of either house of Congress to require a formal recorded vote.
134
 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, argued that “if the yeas and nays 
were proper at all[,] any individual ought to be authorized to call for them: 
and moved an amendment to that effect.”135 At that time, the draft from the 
Committee of Detail required that at least one-fifth of the members present 
seek a recorded vote by the yeas and nays—the requirement that 
ultimately found its way into Article I, Section 5, Clause 3.
136
 Edmund 
Randolph of Virginia seconded Morris’s motion and a general debate 
followed. Ultimately, the convention delegates rejected the proposal by a 
vote of three states to eight.
137
 
This debate is significant: recall that a vote to override a presidential 
veto must be recorded by the “yeas and nays.”138 Yet many of the 
delegates expressed antipathy toward taking recorded votes. For example, 
Roger Sherman argued that he would: “rather strike out the yeas and nays 
altogether. [T]hey never have done any good, and have done much 
mischief. They are not proper as the reasons governing the voter never 
appear along with them.”139 Moreover, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut 
“was of the same opinion.”140 Delegate Nathaniel Ghorum of 
Massachusetts also objected to the use of recorded roll call votes in 
Congress because the practice resulted “in stuffing the journals with them 
on frivolous occasions” and had the effect of “misleading the people who 
 
 
unicameral Congress of the United States under the government created by the Articles of 
Confederation). Finally, one ought to take into account the fact that Congress did not use special self-
executing rules until the 1930s, some 140 years after the Constitution of 1787 came into effect. See 
supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. Surely 140 years of consistent practice—namely taking 
mirror image votes in both houses to pass a bill—should count strongly against the validity of using 
the deem-and-pass procedure to advance multiple, independent bills through a single floor vote. 
 134. 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 255–56 (Aug. 10, 1787). 
 135. Id. at 255. 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the 
Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those 
Present, be entered on the Journal.”) (emphasis added). 
 137. 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 255 (Aug. 10, 1787). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall 
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But 
in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the 
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 139. 2 Farrand, supra note 78, at 255 (Aug. 10, 1787). 
 140. Id. 
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never know the reasons determining the votes.”141 Morris’s motion failed 
by acclamation.
142
 
Despite this general antipathy toward the use of recorded floor votes, 
the delegates nevertheless adopted a text that requires a recorded floor 
vote when each house of Congress considers overriding a presidential 
veto. The logical implication is that the delegates believed that requiring a 
recorded vote in this context would enhance the political accountability of 
the members with respect to each individual member’s decision to support 
or oppose the President’s veto. 
The Federalist Papers also do not shed much light on the question of 
whether a single floor vote in the House of Representatives may pass 
multiple, separate bills. Federalist No. 69, for example, notes that “[t]he 
President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall 
have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and 
the bill so returned is to become a law if, upon that reconsideration, it be 
approved by two thirds of both houses.”143 Federalist No. 69 also notes 
that “[t]he President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present 
concur.”144 
Along similar lines, Federalist No. 73 notes that the Constitution 
“establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body [in the President’s 
veto power], calculated to guard the community against the effects of 
faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, 
which may happen to influence a majority of that body.”145 Federalist 
No. 73 also defends the vesting of the veto in the President alone, rather 
than in a Council of Revision or jointly with members of the federal 
judiciary.
146
 Like Federalist No. 69, however, Federalist No. 73 does not 
speak to the precise question of whether each house of Congress must 
conduct an identical vote to enact a bill. 
In sum, the debates of the Federal Convention in Philadelphia and the 
Federalist Papers, simply do not speak to the question of whether Article I, 
Section 7 requires both houses of Congress not merely to adopt the same 
text, which will be presented to the President, but also to take identical 
votes. On the other hand, the debate regarding whether to allow a single 
 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. (“The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was disagd. 
tonem- con-.”). 
 143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 144. Id. at 419. 
 145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 146. Id. at 446–47. 
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member to demand a recorded floor vote, in lieu of a requirement that at 
least one-fifth of the members present seek a recorded vote, demonstrates 
that the delegates in Philadelphia feared that the ability to demand a 
recorded vote could easily be abused. Nevertheless, the delegates adopted 
a text that automatically mandates a recorded vote by yeas and nays for all 
veto override votes. Moreover, the debates reflect real concern about the 
ability of the President to defend the institutional prerogatives of the 
executive branch against incursions from the legislative branch; these 
concerns led Madison to support, repeatedly and unsuccessfully, a plan to 
vest the veto power jointly either in a Council of Revision or in both the 
executive and judicial branches. In the context of these debates, the record 
vote requirement for a veto override plainly reflects the Framers’ concern 
about ensuring and securing political accountability for the members’ 
votes to support, or oppose, the President’s veto. 
V. A NEO-FORMALIST CRITIQUE OF THE DEEM AND PASS PROCEDURE 
It seems clear that neither the Constitution nor consistent historical 
practice imposes limits on the scope of a particular bill. Thus, a single bill 
could establish appropriations for every federal executive department, 
rewrite multiple criminal laws, and also reorganize the structure of the 
federal judiciary. Unlike most state constitutions, the federal Constitution 
lacks a “single subject” rule, closely related rules against unrelated 
“riders” within bills, and plain title requirements.147 Single subject 
restrictions, bans on riders, and clear title rules came into vogue well into 
the nineteenth century, starting in 1818.
148
 Thus, such provisions 
significantly post-date the Constitution of 1787. 
On the other hand, however, the Framers were quite familiar with 
classical constitutions, including those adopted in Rome and Greece.
149
 
The single subject rule relates back to Roman legislative practice in 98 
BC, during the years of the Republic.
150
 Thus, had the Framers wanted to 
limit the scope of federal bills to a single subject, to ban riders, or to 
 
 
 147. See Ruud, supra note 91, at 389–90 (discussing the adoption of single subject rules in various 
state constitutions, beginning with Illinois in 1818 and continuing in other jurisdictions thereafter). 
 148. See id. at 389–90. 
 149. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard ‘Round the World: Reconsidering the 
Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 2 n.1 (2010). 
 150. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 811. Professor Gilbert notes that to prevent logrolling, or the 
combination of legislation that only enjoys minority support in order to obtain majority support, “the 
Romans in 98 B.C. forbade laws consisting of unrelated provisions.” Id. 
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require a clear title for all bills, they would have been quite familiar with 
these concepts, which all have ancient roots.
151
 
Even so, deem-and-pass plainly constitutes a form of “logrolling,” a 
practice disfavored in the vast majority of state constitutions and that drew 
the ire of angry constituents going back to the time of the Roman 
Republic.
152
 Most contemporary state constitutions contain a rule requiring 
that all bills encompass a single subject; many also prohibit riders or 
mandate the use of “clear titles” that accurately describe a bill’s purpose 
and effect.
153
 All of these devices are aimed to limit, if not entirely 
eradicate, the practice of joining together minorities to enact a bill 
consisting of proposals that, taken alone, could not command majority 
support. As Professor Millard Ruud explains, “[t]he primary and 
universally recognized purpose of the one-subject rule is to prevent log-
rolling in the enactment of laws—the practice of several minorities 
combining their several proposals as different provisions of a single bill 
and thus consolidating their votes so that a majority is obtained for the 
 
 
 151. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 78 TENN. L. REV. 831, 831–32 (2011); see also Brannon P. Denning & 
Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 957, 988–89, 1003–04 (1999) (arguing that although the Framers did not incorporate a single 
subject rule, a ban against riders, or a plain title rule, such limits on Congress’s legislative powers 
would be desirable as a matter of policy). Denning and Smith note that President George H.W. Bush 
claimed that “the Framers understood a ‘bill’ to contain only one subject” and that “therefore, the 
President had discretion to veto parts of legislation containing more than one subject.” Denning & 
Smith, Uneasy Riders, supra, at 961 n.20. Neither the records of the Federal Convention, nor the 
Federalist Papers, seem to offer much direct support of this claim. Moreover, although colonial 
charters sometimes included single subject rules, the first post-Revolutionary state constitution to 
contain such a provision was the Illinois state constitution of 1818, with the next adoption of such a 
rule not taking place until thirty years later, with Michigan adopting a single subject rule in 1843. 
Ruud, supra note 91, at 389–90. Given the ancient roots of the single subject rule, and its observance 
in several colonies, including New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania during the eighteenth century, 
see ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 549–50 (1922), the Framers’ resounding silence on this 
question appears to indicate a rejection of the single subject rule for the federal Congress. This fact, of 
course, cuts against my main argument, at least to some degree. But to say that the Framers did not 
attempt to foreclose omnibus legislation that encompasses more than one subject is not to say that the 
Framers also believed that the houses of Congress would not actually take the same vote on a 
particular bill (whether or not the bill encompassed a single or multiple subjects). 
 152. See LUCE, supra note 151, at 548–49 (discussing the adoption of the Lex Caecilia Didia in 98 
BC to prohibit lex satura, or laws that encompassed wholly unrelated provisions); see also Gilbert, 
supra note 91, at 811 (“The single subject rule can be traced to ancient Rome, where crafty lawmakers 
learned to carry an unpopular provision by ‘harnessing it up with one more favored.’” (quoting Luce)). 
For a history of single subject rules in the colonies and states, see Gilbert, supra note 91, at 811–13 & 
822; Ruud, supra note 91, at 389–96. 
 153. See Gilbert, supra note 91, at 811–17 & 822. 
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omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal of each minority could 
have obtained majority approval separately.”154 
In the absence of a single-subject rule, however, a single bill’s 
substantive content is limited only by the procedural necessity of obtaining 
a majority vote from a quorum of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.
155
 Moreover, the enactment of “Comprehensive Omnibus” bills, 
such as continuing resolutions that fund the operations of the entire federal 
government, has been commonplace since the 1980s. Clearly, then, a 
single floor vote can have an infinite number of substantive effects, at least 
if the provisions that will produce these effects are bundled together in a 
single bill or resolution. Again, the practice in the states is arguably to the 
contrary.
156
 
Moreover, there are no constitutional or historical limits on the 
amendment of a pending bill. A closed rule in the House of 
Representatives might disallow offering and voting on particular 
amendments, but the closed rule must be adopted by the House itself prior 
to consideration of the bill.
157
 Thus, if amendments are limited or 
 
 
 154. Ruud, supra note 91, at 391; see also Gilbert, supra note 91, at 815 (“The single subject rule 
attempts to check logrolling by forbidding unnatural combinations of proposals in acts. The theory is 
that unrelated combinations could only be the product of logrolling.”). 
 155. The standing rules of the House of Representatives do contain an analogue to the single 
subject rule, namely, a requirement that amendments be germane: “No motion or proposition on a 
subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.” RULES 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XVI, cl. 7, H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, 111th Congress, 2011. Of 
course, under a “special rule” that suspends the regular order, this limitation on the scope of an 
amendment can be—and in practice not uncommonly is—waived. The rule has deep roots in House 
procedure; the very first House adopted it in 1789. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES, GERMANENESS, 
available at http://democrats.rules.house.gov/archives/germane_over.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
One should also note that Rule XVI only prevents non-germane amendments and does not prevent 
provisions in the same bill which are non-germane to each other, as the single-subject rule does, see 
id., and is thus much weaker than the state-level rule. 
 156. See Denning & Smith, Uneasy Riders, supra note 151, at 965–67, 1005–25; Gilbert, supra 
note 91, at 811–15, 822; Ruud, supra note 91, at 389–92. 
 157. See HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at § 2, 19; CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 284, 291–93, 296 (1989); see also STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, 
MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN 
SPECIAL RULES 50–74 (1988) (discussing the increasing use over time of special rules to prohibit 
amendments to legislation pending on the House floor); Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and 
Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1831 (2011) (observing that “[i]n the 
contemporary House, few measures are brought to the floor under open rules, which allow any 
member to offer any germane amendment” and noting that “[i]nstead, most controversial measures are 
offered under closed rules, which prohibit all amendments, or special rules that so greatly restrict 
amendments as to be effectively closed”); Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 
1365–68, 1375–78, 1385–87 (2010) (discussing the closed rule and its increasing use in the 
contemporary House of Representatives); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional 
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 94–95 (1987) (discussing the mechanics 
of the conference committee reconciliation process and the utility of using closed rules to the majority 
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prohibited with respect to a particular bill, this is so not because the 
Constitution itself limits the amendment process, but because the House 
elected to impose such a restraint on itself with respect to its consideration 
of a particular legislative measure. Accordingly, then, there can be no 
serious objection to the House considering an omnibus bill or linking a 
group of bills together via the amendment process. 
However, the deem-and-pass procedure neither combines measures 
into a single bill, nor does it require a vote to amend a particular bill to 
incorporate another measure. Instead, it gives ancillary and independent 
legislative effects to a single vote on a particular bill. Deem-and-pass 
splits and multiplies the legal effect of a single floor vote with respect to 
independent pieces of legislation. Moreover, it does so to render the 
legislative process opaque and undermine transparency in an effort to 
confuse—or even deceive—voters.158 So, the fact that the House can 
consider an omnibus bill or amend a pending measure to incorporate 
wholly unrelated legislation does not really tell us anything useful about 
whether a single vote can pass multiple independent bills. 
A functionalist argument exists that could be made in favor of deem-
and-pass special rules, and it derives from the fact that no substantive 
limits exist on the scope of a particular bill or amendments to a pending 
bill. If the House can link unrelated statutory language together via an 
omnibus bill or the amendment process on the floor, why can’t the House 
achieve the same legal effect by using a deem-and-pass rule? In other 
words, if the House, by a majority vote, could incorporate an unrelated bill 
into a piece of legislation pending on the floor, what is the harm in 
permitting the House to achieve the same result by adopting a rule that 
says “the enactment of bill A will imply the passage of bill B”? The 
practical effect of this rule is simply to incorporate the entire substance of 
bill B into the text of bill A; the only difference is that, strictly speaking, 
 
 
party’s leadership in controlling the legislative process in this context); Charles Tiefer, Congress’s 
Transformative “Republican Revolution” in 2001–2006 and the Future of One-Party Rule, 23 J.L. & 
POL. 233, 256–59 (2007) (discussing the increasingly frequent use of closed rules to disallow even 
clearly germane amendments and thereby permit the majority caucus to enact “ideological versions of 
key bills without competition”). Under the standing rules of the House, an amendment need only be 
germane in order to be moved from the floor. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. 
XVI, cl. 7, H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, 111th Cong., 2011 (“No motion or proposition on a subject 
different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.”). In order to 
establish a closed rule, the House must adopt a Rules Committee Report calling for it. See Doran, The 
Closed Rule, supra, at 1367 (noting that “[e]ach closed rule must be put to a vote of the full House, 
but, with rare exceptions (such as the vote that galled President Reagan), the floor ratifies the closed 
rules proposed by managers” and observing that “[t]he closed rule now constitutes one of the most 
important parts of the legislative process”). 
 158. See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1017–18; Mayhew, supra note 68, at 53–62. 
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bill A and bill B remain separate pieces of legislation for all other 
purposes. From a functionalist perspective, perhaps this is a distinction 
without a difference. 
From a formalist perspective, however, a significant difference exists 
between amending a bill to incorporate all of the material provisions of 
another piece of legislation and using a deem-and-pass special rule. 
Because deem-and-pass retains the separate legislative identities of both 
bills, rather than actually merging them into a single text, both bills must 
be enacted by the Senate and also presented to the President. Thus, if the 
House voted to amend bill A by incorporating all of the content of bill B, 
the combined bill would go to the Senate and, if passed in that chamber, to 
the President.
159
 Both the Senate and the President would be required to 
consider and to act on bill A/B, rather than separately on bill A and bill B. 
If the Senate wished to divide the bill, by amending bill A/B to extract the 
content of bill B, then the amended bill would have to be returned to the 
House and repassed as amended. 
So too, if the Senate decided to pass bill A/B, it would go directly to 
the President for his consideration. The President would not have the 
option of signing only the provisions of the bill that derived from bill A, 
but would have to sign bill A/B or veto all of its provisions.
160
 Had the 
House and Senate each voted on a separate bill A and bill B, however, the 
President would be able to sign only one of the two bills and to veto the 
other. 
When the House enacts separate bills the subsequent legislative process 
will require the assent of the Senate and the President on two separate 
pieces of legislation, rather than only on one. This, in turn, means that the 
Senate and President must go on record as supporting or opposing A and 
B, rather than both propositions at once. The House, by way of contrast, if 
it has used a deem-and-pass procedure under a special rule, may have 
taken a single vote to approve the content of both bills at the same time. 
Thus, although the House will have approved the content of a Senate 
approved bill, the Senate and House will actually have taken very different 
votes. 
And, it is precisely at this point that the sledding gets particularly 
rough. Does the Constitution permit the House to vote on a set of 
propositions that differs from the separate votes taken by the Senate? 
Should it matter that the Senate and President must take political 
 
 
 159. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). 
 160. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 437–40, 448–49 (1998). 
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responsibility for two independent sets of propositions, rather than the 
material equivalent of a combined bill? Or that the House did not vote on 
the same precise question as the Senate? Contra Professor Balkin,
161
 I 
think that it should make a difference, at least when the deem-and-pass 
procedure is used to adopt a bill already enacted by the Senate. 
When the House uses a deem-and-pass special rule to deem adopted a 
bill already passed in the Senate, it essentially is voting to adopt an 
amended version of the bill that the Senate did not enact.
162
 Even so, only 
the House-initiated bill goes to the Senate for the Senate’s consideration. 
The Senate bill goes to the President for his consideration. Thus, the 
Senate is effectively forced to vote separately for A and B. So too, the 
President must decide to sign A without even knowing whether B will 
advance from the Senate to his desk.
163
 Thus, the use of the deem-and-pass 
procedure, at least with respect to a bill that has already passed the Senate, 
has the effect of permitting the House to vote simultaneously on a package 
of statutory effects, whereas the Senate and the President are forced to 
consider these measures separately. 
One could take the view that nothing in the Constitution’s text 
absolutely requires that the Senate and President ask and answer the same 
questions as the House when deciding whether to approve or reject a 
specific piece of legislation.
164
 As Professor Linda Jellum notes, “[t]he 
 
 
 161. See Balkin, supra note 11; see also Richey, supra note 11. 
 162. See McConnell, supra note 10, at A15. 
 163. The Constitution gives the president a limited amount of time in which to decide whether to 
sign or veto a bill presented to him after enactment by both houses of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 7, cl. 2; Randall, supra note 74, at 507–16. Thus, if the House were to use a deem-and-pass rule to 
enact a bill already passed by the Senate, as well as a bill pending before the House, it is entirely 
possible that the President would have to act on bill A before knowing the fate of bill B in the Senate. 
If the President were to wait beyond the constitutionally provided deadline, the bill would either 
become a law without his signature after ten days (assuming Congress remains in session) or, if 
Congress had recessed, the bill would not become a law (a so-called “pocket veto”). 
 164. See Balkin, supra note 11. Professor Balkin explains his position, which is thoroughly 
functionalist, as follows: 
The structural constitutional reason for this requirement is that members of the House must 
not be able to avoid political accountability for passing the same bill as the Senate. The point 
of bicameralism and presentment is that all three actors (House, Senate and President) must 
agree to the legislation, warts and all, so that all three can be held politically accountable for 
it. They cannot point fingers at the other actors and deny responsibility for the policy choices 
made. The House cannot say, “oh we didn’t pass X; that was the Senate’s decision.” If the 
House doesn’t accept the same language as its own, even if that language is then immediately 
changed in an accompanying bill, there is no law. 
Id. When one casts the language of Article I, Section 7 in purposive terms, however, one has made an 
unstated argument that the form of passage does not matter, provided that passage, in whatever form, 
takes place. Although the Supreme Court has not spoken to this precise question, it has construed the 
provisions of Article I, Section 7 in literal, rather than purposive, terms at least twice in the modern 
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functionalist approach emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic 
flexibility to respond to modern government.”165 Functionalists, as 
Professors Elizabeth Magill and Thomas Merrill observe, tend to “resolve 
structural disputes ‘not in terms of fixed rules but rather in light of an 
evolving standard designed to advance the ultimate purposes of a system 
of separation of powers.’”166 Open-ended balancing tests, cost/benefit 
analysis, and a focus on the potential utility of novel administrative 
structures and procedures tend to matter more in functionalist analysis 
than strict adherence to enforcing the Framers’ system of carefully 
separated and divided government powers within the three branches of the 
 
 
era. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (“The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is 
a 500-page document that became ‘Public Law 105-33’ after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a 
bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of 
Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law 
by the President. The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken before a 
bill may ‘become a law.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7)); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 
(1983) (“The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient 
shortcut; the ‘sharing’ with the Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on 
its face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be 
taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is crystal clear from the records of the 
Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than 
efficiency.”). Thus, “[t]here is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the 
national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. 
 Professor Balkin’s argument, premised on the practical effect of a vote, rather than its precise 
form and structure, seems more consistent with the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice White in 
Chadha, see Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967–68 (White, J., dissenting) (“The prominence of the legislative 
veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its importance to Congress can hardly be 
overstated. It has become a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive 
and independent agencies.”); id. at 978–79 (“In my view, neither Art. I of the Constitution nor the 
doctrine of separation of powers is violated by this mechanism by which our elected Representatives 
preserve their voice in the governance of the Nation.”); id. at 994 (“The central concern of the 
presentment and bicameralism requirements of Art. I is that when a departure from the legal status quo 
is undertaken, it is done with the approval of the President and both Houses of Congress—or, in the 
event of a Presidential veto, a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This interest is fully satisfied by the 
operation of § 244(c)(2).”), and Mr. Justice Breyer in Clinton, 524 U.S. at 469–70 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“In my view the Line Item Veto Act (Act) does not violate any specific textual 
constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit separation-of-powers principle. Consequently, 
I believe that the Act is constitutional.”); id. at 473 (“The background circumstances also mean that we 
are to interpret nonliteral separation-of-powers principles in light of the need for ‘workable 
government.’ . . . If we apply those principles in light of that objective, as this Court has applied them 
in the past, the Act is constitutional.”). I am not suggesting that a functionalist perspective on these 
separation of powers issues is not plausible or defensible; I am suggesting that, in this context, the 
Supreme Court has steadfastly demonstrated a formalist approach that strictly enforces the literal terms 
of Article I, Section 7. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta 
and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 422–23, 475–85 (1997). 
 165. Jellum, supra note 22, at 854–55. 
 166. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1127, 1142 (2000) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231 (1991)). 
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federal government. Professor John Manning aptly notes that 
“functionalists view the Constitution as emphasizing the balance, and not 
the separation, of powers.”167 
From a functionalist perspective, strictly reading the bicameralism 
requirement of Article I, Section 7 to require anything more than that both 
houses of Congress agree to adopt the same text represents an unduly 
formalistic approach. Provided that both houses agree to adopt the exact 
same text, the precise means used to manifest this agreement is, if not 
entirely irrelevant, then largely so. And, as noted earlier, Professor 
Balkin’s analysis of the deem-and-pass maneuver reflects and incorporates 
this perspective—and thus is thoroughly functionalist in character.168 
However, from a formalist perspective, the legislative process set forth 
in the Constitution should be strictly enforced—meaning that the House, 
Senate, and President assent to the exact same set of propositions at the 
same time. This is so because otherwise the political accountability of the 
House would be different than the political accountability of the Senate 
and President. Members of the House, running for reelection, could 
truthfully state “I did not vote for bill A—I only voted for bill A as it 
would be amended by bill B.” Thus, if bill A becomes law (e.g., the House 
“deems passed” Senate-originated bill A and the President signs it upon 
presentment), but bill B fails to secure passage in the Senate and is not 
ultimately enacted, then the Senate and President are on the hook for a set 
of legislative outcomes that House members can fairly say that they did 
not agree to independently of bill B. 
A functionalist argument may also be put forward in support of this 
approach, although I think Professor Balkin’s analysis constitutes the most 
obvious functionalist position.
169
 Requiring identical votes in both houses 
of Congress advances the important values of accountability and 
transparency. Because the Constitution does not directly specify that 
congressional procedures must advance these values, one could argue that 
they are simply normative values loosely, but obviously, associated with 
the concept of democratic accountability through free and fair elections. 
 
 
 167. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1952 (2011). Professor Manning also posits that “[f]unctionalists believe that the Constitution’s 
structural clauses ultimately supply few useful details of meaning.” Id. at 1950. 
 168. See supra note 164. 
 169. This is so because Balkin focuses on the fact that both houses adopted or “owned” the 
identical text, even if they did not do so by taking identical votes on the exact same propositions (no 
more, and no less); thus, for Balkin, the precise means used to enact a bill is entirely immaterial, so 
long as both houses of Congress adopt the same text and the President signs the bill or Congress 
successfully votes to override the President’s veto. See Balkin, supra note 11. 
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This functionalist argument focuses on advancing particular substantive 
values rather than on a clear directive regarding the placement of a 
particular governmental power or responsibility within a specific 
institution of the federal government.
170
 
On the other hand, a pragmatic formalist could embrace these values 
under the rubric of Article I, Section 7’s requirement of bicameralism. 
Indeed, I would argue that this reasoning is primarily formalist; this is so 
because formalism encompasses procedural rules and limits derived from 
(or implied by) structural limitations.
171
 
For example, Myers v. United States,
172
 an iconic formalist opinion, 
relies on implied limits on Congress’s power to remove executive officers 
derived from the Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses.
173
 The Myers 
majority opinion embraces separation of powers limits that create a unitary 
executive officer, namely the President, and vest this person with a duty to 
oversee the execution of federal laws. Strictly speaking, the Constitution’s 
text does not directly speak to whether Congress may reserve for itself 
some say in the removal of executive officers appointed with the Senate’s 
advice and consent. Nevertheless, Myers draws reasonable implications 
from key provisions of Article II to disallow congressional efforts to claim 
a veto power over the President’s ability to remove executive officers in 
whom he lacks confidence. Myers demonstrates quite clearly that 
implications derived from structure often serve as the basis for “formalist” 
arguments. 
Thus, formalism does not, strictly speaking, require a text-based 
mandate for its rules and strictures. It encompasses logical implications 
derived from the Constitution’s structure and allocation of powers among 
 
 
 170. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 119 (1926) (holding that “the President 
has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate”) with Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602 (1935) (holding that limits on the President’s removal power do not automatically violate the 
separation of powers, at least when Congress does not attempt to exercise the removal power directly, 
and when the office in question does not exercise a core executive power or function). Simply put, 
formalism is not necessarily limited or bound by strictly textualist arguments—implications from text 
and structure can create limits on novel administrative structures and practices. 
 171. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147, 3153–56 (2010) (invalidating 
the good cause removal protection for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
on formalist separation of powers grounds, despite the fact that the Constitution itself is entirely silent 
on the question of the removal power of executive branch officers and specifies only the means of 
appointing principal and inferior officers of the United States); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. at 
art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & art. I, § 3, cls. 6–7 (providing a legislative means of removing executive and judicial 
officers through the impeachment power). 
 172. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 173. Id. at 163–64. 
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the three branches of the federal government. Text can be one (or more) 
level removed from a formalist argument.
174
 
Returning to the hypothetical enactment of Senate-initiated bill A as a 
function of floor passage of House-initiated bill B, the public can and 
should blame the House for enactment of bill A, if the bill proves to be 
unpopular. But, the members of the House of Representatives did not 
agree to pass bill A independently of bill B. If the legislative process in 
Congress requires that both houses enact the mirror image of a bill, deem-
and-pass should be seen as objectionable because it permits the House to 
give its assent to a different package of outcomes than the Senate voted 
upon. Deem-and-pass, under this view, constitutes a kind of agreement 
between the two houses of Congress to adopt a bill into law but with the 
House of Representatives crossing its fingers behind its back. The House 
essentially says, “I agree to this and that,” rather than “I will only agree to 
this if that also gets incorporated into the bill via amendment (which 
would require the amended bill to return to the Senate for its 
consideration).” Through the deem-and-pass process, the House goes on 
record supporting legislative outcomes not yet considered by the Senate, 
but the legislation approved by the Senate goes directly to the White 
House.
175
 
This outcome does a disservice to both the Senate and the President. 
The use of a deem-and-pass special rule to enact a bill previously passed 
in the Senate essentially tells the Senate “yes, but” and permits the House 
to claim, truthfully, that it voted on a different measure than the Senate 
while formally advancing the Senate bill to the President. Moreover, the 
President must make independent decisions on both bills should the 
House-initiated bill clear the Senate. Arguably, this violates a 
constitutional expectation that both houses of Congress ask and answer the 
same question when adopting a new law.
176
 As Professor McConnell has 
noted, “[i]t is one thing for the Supreme Court to defer to Congress on 
questions of what Congress did, and quite another to defer to Congress on 
the meaning of the Constitution.”177 
 
 
 174. For a discussion of the meaning of formalism and the contemporary Supreme Court’s 
embrace of formalism, see The New Formalism, supra note 90, at 1601, 1611–15. 
 175. See McConnell, supra note 10, at A15. 
 176. See infra notes 177 & 187; see also supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text. 
 177. McConnell, supra note 10, at A15. As Professor McConnell explains: 
No one doubts that the House can consolidate two bills in a single measure; the question is 
whether, having done so, it may then hive the resulting bill into two parts, treating one part as 
an enrolled bill ready for presidential signature and the other part as a House bill ready for 
senatorial consideration. That seems inconsistent with the principle that the president may 
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There is, however, a significant difference in the position of the Senate 
and the President in all of this. The President will know the context of bill 
B and undoubtedly will have some sense of the probability of its 
enactment. If forced to act on bill A before the Senate votes on bill B, the 
President can speak directly to his reasons for choosing whether to sign 
bill A in light of the uncertainties associated with bill B. 
The Senate’s members, by way of contrast, took political 
accountability for the content of bill A on the assumption that their 
colleagues in the House of Representatives would vote on bill A’s 
provisions and enact them, amend them (giving the Senate a clean chance 
to adopt or reject the amended bill), or reject them. Instead, the House 
advances bill A directly to the President, while at the same time sending 
the Senate a package of amendments for its consideration. The Senate, 
unlike the President, never has an opportunity to consider the linked 
propositions concurrently and prospectively. The Senate must take 
political accountability for a measure that it might not have passed in the 
first instance, had it known that the House would only give its assent if it 
could also contemporaneously enact changes to the bill in a separate piece 
of legislation. 
 
 
sign only bills in the exact form that they have passed both houses. A combination of two 
bills is not in “the same form” as either bill separately. 
Id. Under this logic, Professor McConnell would presumably not object to the use of a self-executing 
rule to achieve two (or more) unrelated legislative actions—i.e., to pass a new House originated bill 
and also to send an unrelated Senate-passed bill to the president. His precise objection is that the 
House cannot pass a Senate-passed bill and, at the same time, enact a package of amendments to that 
bill, with one bill going to the President (the Senate-passed bill) and the other to the Senate (the 
House-initiated package of amendments). Indeed, one could think of this as a kind of inter-house 
delegation: the House essentially says “we approve the Senate bill,” and in addition, delegates to the 
Senate the power to accept, or reject, a package of amendments to the Senate’s bill without the 
Senate’s rejection of the amendments bill precluding enrollment of the original Senate-passed bill. 
 A broader objection to the deem-and-pass procedure exists: one could reasonably argue that 
Article I, Section 7 requires not merely the enactment of the same text, but also both houses of 
Congress taking an identical vote. The question, at bottom, is whether the “mirror image” requirement 
should extend both to the text of the bill and also to the precise floor action used to enact it. From the 
perspective of securing political accountability, requiring identical floor action would be desirable, 
insofar as it would make it harder for members to disclaim responsibility for the entire package of 
legislative actions by saying “I voted yes, but only because I wanted to pass bill X, and not bill Y.” See 
Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1018 (“‘Self-executing’ rules have a similar ability to insulate 
members from controversial decisions.”). As Professors Frymer and Yoon astutely note,  
The key is that the party leadership wants to find a way to structure the choices offered to its 
members on the House floor so that members can vote with the party without deeply 
offending their constituents, and, if constituents are offended, to cover up their own 
involvement in the legislation’s passage. 
Id. 
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And, if Article I, Section 5 permits the House to adopt a special rule 
that allows a single floor vote to advance multiple, wholly-independent 
pieces of legislation, no good argument exists against the Senate following 
suit by incorporating this maneuver into its own standing rules. Were both 
houses of Congress to utilize the deem-and-pass procedure, the dangers 
inherent in logrolling would become acute. Both houses could take votes 
with plural effects, and members could disclaim responsibility for 
particular outcomes that they found politically objectionable. 
What is more, logrolling would permit the enactment of multiple pieces 
of legislation lacking majority support.
178
 By linking together unrelated 
propositions, each of which lacks majority support, it becomes possible to 
obtain a majority for an omnibus measure by obtaining the support of 
multiple minority factions.
179
 At the federal level, Congress does not 
legislate under a single subject requirement, but that does not answer the 
question of whether the House may use a single vote to enact multiple bills 
while the Senate must consider each question separately without uniting 
into a single bill the multiple legislative objectives enjoying only minority 
support.
180
 
Essentially, in this legislative free for all, a kind of legislative ping 
pong would ensue with some bills going to the President, others going to 
the other chamber, and laws being enacted even though neither chamber 
actually considered and assented to the particular propositions contained 
within the four corners a single bill. A bill would be “passed” even though 
both houses of Congress failed to agree to that bill, and that bill only. Such 
an outcome seems fundamentally inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
 
 
 178. See Ruud, supra note 91, at 391 (“The primary and universally recognized purpose of the 
one-subject rule is to prevent log-rolling in the enactment of laws—the practice of several minorities 
combining their several proposals as different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating their 
votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal of each 
minority could have obtained majority approval separately.”); see also Gilbert, supra note 91, at 813 
(noting that preventing logrolling is a primary reason for adopting a single subject rule and title 
requirement). Gilbert describes the “three principal purposes” of single subject and title requirements 
as “(1) to prevent logrolling, (2) to prevent riding, and (3) to improve political transparency.” Id. 
Gilbert also posits a fourth possible rationale—protecting a governor’s veto power. Id. 
 179. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 813–15. 
 180. Of course, were the Senate to amend its standing rules to permit the use of the deem-and-pass 
procedure, it would be possible for bills to be enacted without any guaranty that any particular 
provision, or set of provisions, actually enjoys majority support within either the House or Senate. 
Obviously, this has the effect of severely undermining the checking effect created by the bicameralism 
requirement—a requirement that should entail that a bill, however broadly or narrowly framed, enjoys 
majority support in both houses of Congress. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DECONSTRUCTING DEEM AND PASS 1115 
 
 
 
 
enforcement of the bicameralism and presentment rules in decisions such 
as Chadha
181
 and Clinton.
182
 
If the deem-and-pass legislation is used outside the context of a Senate-
enacted bill, however, the constitutional harm seems more attenuated.
183
 If 
the House could enact an omnibus bill or amend a bill to combine various, 
unrelated pieces of legislation, and that omnibus or amended bill went to 
the Senate, the outcome would be no different than if the House had 
chosen to deem-and-pass three nominally separate House bills at the same 
time and send them to the Senate for its consideration. In that case, the 
Senate could combine all three bills into one through amendment. If the 
Senate did this, it would be voting on the same linked statutory provisions 
that the House enacted. Alternatively, the Senate could enact only one or 
two of the three independent bills, and could reject one or two of the bills 
passed by the House via a single vote. It is also entirely possible that the 
Senate might consider only some of the bills, and permit others to die in 
committee without formal action as a body. 
This would have the effect of permitting the House to vote once on a 
linked set of propositions and allowing the Senate to decide whether it 
wishes to advance some or all of the provisions to the White House. The 
House, however, would have full knowledge that it might be voting on 
provisions that the Senate would either reject or fail to consider. To the 
extent that the House takes political accountability for passing measures 
that the Senate chooses not to adopt, it does so with full knowledge of that 
potential outcome; it is not subject to an ambush by the Senate. The House 
is essentially inviting the Senate to agree to some or all of the individual 
legislative proposals. 
 
 
 181. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). 
 182. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–47 (1998). 
 183. Of course, from a strictly formalist perspective, the degree of constitutional harm is not the 
relevant metric; any derogation from the Framer’s design must be rejected in favor strict observance of 
the separation of powers. See Jellum, supra note 22, at 861–70; The New Formalism, supra note 90, at 
1612–13; see also Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 (2010) (interpreting the Vesting 
and Faithful Execution Clauses of Article II to imply a presidential power of oversight and removal 
and arguing that unduly insulating executive branch officers from presidential control “violates the 
basic principle that the President ‘cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to 
supervise that goes with it,’ because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions of 
the Executive Branch’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928–33 (1997) (disallowing the 
“commandeering” of state executive officers to enforce federal laws under a formalist theory of the 
separation of state and federal power and asserting that such arrangements tend to undermine “political 
accountability”). Thus, if Article I, Section 7 requires both houses of Congress to vote on the same 
question as well as adopt the same legislative texts, the fact that a self-executing rule permits the 
House to take a different vote than the Senate is objectionable regardless of whether or not the 
procedure is used only to advance a group of House-originated bills to the Senate. 
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If any political accountability is lost, it is lost only by virtue of entirely 
voluntary decisions by the House and Senate. And, these decisions are 
made prospectively rather than retrospectively.
184
 The use of the deem-
and-pass procedure effectively delegates to the Senate the power to accept 
or reject any of the House-passed bills. This constitutes a kind of intra-
branch delegation of the House’s pre-approval of Senate amendments, 
albeit of a specified sort (i.e., “enact A, B, and/or C and we, the House, 
agree in advance to this outcome”). 
By way of contrast, when the House uses the deem-and-pass procedure 
on a bill already enacted by the Senate, the House gets to have its cake and 
eat it, too. The House members are able to adopt the Senate bill and also 
some additional legislative proposals, including amendments to the Senate 
bill itself. The House essentially agrees to adopt a different bill, but 
advances the Senate bill to the President by maintaining the formal 
separation of the Senate bill and House amendments. This leaves it up to 
the Senate to concur with or reject the House amendments and creates a 
possible presidential veto of the House amendments even if the Senate 
adopts the House bill amending the Senate’s earlier work.185 
To the extent that the political accountability arising from the votes 
differs, this effect takes place on a retrospective basis because the Senate 
finds itself effectively cornered by the House of Representatives. The “yes, 
but” effect of the deem-and-pass procedure means that even though the 
Senate and House agreed to different versions of the same bill, the House 
is able to advance the Senate’s bill to the President while, simultaneously, 
proposing amendments to the same bill.
186
 The Senate should be able to 
vote on pending legislation without having to wonder if the House will ask 
and answer a different legislative question even as it advances the 
nominally un-amended Senate bill to the President. 
Of course, up to this point, the accountability analysis has focused 
almost exclusively on the relationship of the two houses of Congress to 
each other, rather than on the relationship of both houses of Congress to 
their constituents. Viewed from a broader perspective, the very use of a 
 
 
 184. This is, admittedly, a somewhat functionalist argument. But cf. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 
at 3155 (arguing that “[t]he diffusion of [political] power carries with it a diffusion of accountability”). 
Although a thoroughly formalist decision, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Free Enterprise 
Fund does offer functional reasons, like accountability, in support of the outcome. See The New 
Formalism, supra note 90, at 1616–17 (observing that “practical concerns still animated the Chief 
Justice’s analysis”). 
 185. Arguably, this constitutes a kind of “logrolling.” See Gilbert, supra note 91, at 813–15. One 
could also conceive of the House-initiated bill as a kind of “rider.” See id. at 815–16. 
 186. See McConnell, supra note 10, at A15. 
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deem-and-pass special rule to enact multiple House-originated bills by a 
single floor vote might be seen as objectionable.
187
 This is because the 
voters’ ability to hold members accountable for each separate vote is 
diminished by linking together multiple, perhaps wholly unrelated, 
questions in separate legislation yet enacting everything concurrently with 
a single floor vote.
188
 Voting to delegate to the Senate the authority to 
enact one, two, or three separate bills simply is not the same as voting 
separately on each bill or voting to enact a single bill containing the same 
content. 
If the House sends three separate bills with multiple legislative effects 
to the Senate via a single vote, it empowers its members to claim that they 
supported only some of the measures, but not all three. A member might 
well claim that she felt constrained to pass all three bills and forward them 
to the Senate in order to achieve passage of the one bill about which she 
 
 
 187. This absolutist approach seems more consistent with the Supreme Court’s most recent 
articulations of formalist reasoning when deciding separation of powers questions, which do not seem 
to permit any room for de minimis violations. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153–55 (2011); 
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609, 2619 (2011); see also The New Formalism, supra note 90, at 
1615–23. But see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should abjure “formalistic and unbending rules” in separation of powers analysis in favor of an open 
ended balancing approach that would encompass a thorough “examination of certain relevant factors”). 
Formalism relies on analysis of the kind of power at issue, and the Constitution’s assignment of that 
power to a particular branch of the federal government, rather than on distinctions based on the scope 
of departure from the Framers’ blueprint that a particular administrative structure reflects and 
incorporates. Accordingly, lines based on degrees of derogation from the Framers’ design generally 
are the province of functionalists. See The New Formalism, supra note 90, at 1612–14. Here, the root 
of the formalist argument is the requirement of bicameralism, coupled with the requirement that 
members of the House and Senate be regularly elected by the people. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; 
infra note 188 (citing and quoting the Constitution’s requirements that members of the House of 
Representatives and Senate be elected by the people within the states). When the House votes on a 
different proposition than the Senate, it undermines the animating purpose of the bicameralism 
requirement, namely political accountability and the closely related value of political transparency. 
Attempting to avoid political responsibility for the enactment of unpopular legislation seems flatly 
inconsistent with the obvious implications of the Framers’ design. To be clear, I recognize that from a 
hard-core functionalist perspective, efforts to “hide the ball” do not matter so long as the House owns 
the text of the bill even if it does so only indirectly or by implication. See Balkin, supra note 11. 
 188. One should note that accountability to the voters arises not only from Article I, Section 7, but 
also from Article I, Section 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment, which establish that members of the 
House and Senate must be elected by the people. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (“The Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–31 
(1997) (emphasizing the importance of political accountability in the context of making and enforcing 
particular substantive legal policies, such as gun control measures); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 168–69, 178–79 (1992) (arguing that preserving political accountability precludes Congress 
from requiring states to enact legislation). 
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really cared.
189
 If the House had enacted a single measure that 
incorporated the content of all three bills, however, the member would 
take clear political responsibility for the passage of the entire content of 
the bill. Passage by implication seeks to obfuscate that responsibility and 
thereby undermines political accountability.
190
 
Independent of objections related to hiving what is really a single bill 
into multiple, independent bills, another non-delegation objection exists to 
the use of the deem-and-pass special rule. This objection relates to the 
political dynamics associated with such de facto delegations of lawmaking 
power to the Senate. The use of a single floor vote to advance multiple, 
independent bills involves the House essentially telling the Senate, “you 
have authority to pass all or none of these propositions without consulting 
us any further.” If a single bill contained three main titles, and the Senate 
wished to enact only one or two of the titles, it normally would have to 
amend the bill and return the amended bill to the House. The House, in 
turn, would have to enact the amended Senate version of the bill, meaning 
that members would have to pass a version of the bill that omits at least 
some of the content in the original bill. Obviously, the dynamics of 
holding independent votes on three separate pieces of legislation—or a 
unified single bill with multiple titles—would be different than a virtual 
vote on all the bills being piggybacked onto the single substantive floor 
vote by a deem-and-pass special rule. 
In the end, the objection to the deem-and-pass special rule might be 
strongest where the House yokes a presidential veto override to some other 
piece of legislation, somewhat weaker in the context of using the 
procedure to enact a Senate-originated bill, and perhaps weakest with 
respect to the enactment of multiple House-initiated bills via a single floor 
vote. In all these cases, however, a strong argument exists that the use of 
deem-and-pass rules to advance legislation, whether to the Senate or the 
President, constitutes a derogation from Article I, Section 7, which should 
be read to require the House and Senate to take mirror image votes that 
have identical legislative effects. 
 
 
 189. See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1017–18. 
 190. See generally New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (“But where the Federal Government directs the 
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral 
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters 
not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
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VI. WOULD THE FEDERAL COURTS REACH THE MERITS OF A CHALLENGE 
TO A BILL ENACTED VIA A DEEM-AND-PASS SPECIAL RULE? 
Regardless of the merits of the claim that House enactment of a bill by 
implication violates the requirements of Article I, Section 7, would the 
federal courts adjudicate such a claim? Or, instead, would the 
constitutional sufficiency of enactment by implication constitute a non-
justiciable “political question”?191 The problem, in this specific context, is 
somewhat compounded by the enrolled bill doctrine,
192
 under which the 
federal courts specifically abjure considering whether Congress duly 
passed an enrolled statute because “the need for finality and certainty 
about the status of a statute contribute to judicial reluctance to inquire 
whether, as passed, it complied with all requisite formalities.”193 Even 
assuming that a plaintiff with standing could be found,
194
 the question of 
whether the deem-and-pass procedure violates Article I would have to 
overcome the argument that the issue presents a non-justiciable claim. 
This answer is not obvious, and it might well be that some objections to 
use of a deem–and-pass special rule would be justiciable, whereas others 
might not. For example, suppose that the House of Representatives used 
the deem-and-pass procedure to consider overriding a presidential veto, 
and the override vote achieved the requisite two-thirds majority. The 
President might well object that the House failed to observe the procedure 
set forth in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 by yoking the veto override vote 
to a wholly unrelated piece of legislation. Because the override vote was 
annexed to a vote on an unrelated piece of legislation, the President might 
well claim that members had evaded their constitutional responsibility to 
take a public, recorded vote on whether or not to sustain the veto.
195
 To be 
sure, this illustration is merely hypothetical; a deem-and-pass special rule 
has never been used in this context. Nevertheless, if the House or Senate 
 
 
 191. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–17 (1962); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political 
Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). 
 192. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676–77 (1892). 
 193. Baker, 369 U.S. at 214. 
 194. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lacked Article 
III standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the Line Item Veto Act and positing that such a 
challenge would not be ripe for adjudication until the President actually exercised a line item “veto” of 
the sort authorized by the act). 
 195. Members voting in favor of the combined question might claim that they did not wish to 
override the veto but nevertheless supported passage of the unrelated bill. Forced to choose between 
rejecting the veto and passing the annexed bill or rejecting both with the same negative vote, a member 
might claim to have voted in the affirmative notwithstanding a desire to sustain the veto. 
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rules permitted a veto override by implication, a good argument supports 
the claim that a justiciable question would exist, given the text of Article I. 
However, suppose the use of a deem-and-pass procedure does not 
involve a presidential veto override vote—what then? For a court to 
consider the merits of the claim, the reviewing court would have to 
consider the procedural adequacy of the special rule itself. Such 
consideration, at least arguably, would transgress the rule against deciding 
non-justiciable political questions. Indeed, there are two relevant doctrines 
of non-justiciability. First, there is a specialized doctrine of non-
justiciability applicable to enrolled bills and constitutional amendments 
declared ratified. Second, there is the more generic “political question” 
doctrine, and a prime example would be the “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” of a particular question to Congress or the 
President.
196
 
As a general matter, the federal courts will not inquire into the 
procedural adequacy of enactment of a statute, provided that the bill has 
been signed by the leadership of both houses of Congress and the 
President.
197
 In Field v. Clark, Justice Harlan explains that: 
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by 
the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an 
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has 
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their 
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has 
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of 
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the 
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall 
be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his 
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication 
as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and 
unimpeachable.
198
 
Accordingly, the federal courts typically will not consider whether an 
enrolled bill signed by the President was in fact properly passed in both 
houses of Congress.
199
 
 
 
 196. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993). 
 197. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 198. Id. at 672. 
 199. See id. at 680 (holding that “it is not competent for the appellants to show, from the journals 
of either house, from the reports of committees or from other documents printed by authority of 
Congress, that [an] enrolled bill” was not properly enacted into law). 
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This rule reflects and incorporates the respect due to Congress, as well 
as a number of practical difficulties that would arise if the federal courts 
routinely required proof of passage of a bill beyond the signatures of the 
Speaker and President of the Senate.
200
 Moreover, the Constitution itself 
does not specify how Congress must authenticate passage of a pending 
bill. No clause of the Constitution “either expressly or by necessary 
implication, prescribe[s] the mode in which the fact of the original passage 
of a bill by the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be 
authenticated, or preclude Congress from adopting any mode to that end 
which its wisdom suggests.”201 Finally, practical difficulties would arise if 
courts routinely were required to inquire into the validity of all federal 
statutes.
202
 
In sum, “[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments 
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, 
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated: 
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, 
whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the 
Constitution.”203 Under this strong rule of non-justiciability, a serious 
question exists regarding whether the federal courts would reach the merits 
of a challenge to a law the House passed by implication using the deem-
and-pass maneuver.
204
 Under Field, the federal courts arguably should 
 
 
 200. See id. at 670 (noting that “we cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if 
this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which 
depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been authenticated by the 
signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and by the approval of the 
President, and been deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, was not in fact passed by 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, and therefore did not become a law.” (emphasis in the 
original). 
 201. Id. at 671. 
 202. See id. at 676–77 (noting that “[e]very suit before every court, where the validity of a statute 
may be called into question as affecting the right of a litigant, will be in the nature of an appeal or writ 
of error or bill of review for errors apparent on the face of the legislative records” and suggesting that 
“[i]f [a court] may go beyond the enrolled and signed bill and try its validity by the record contained in 
the journals, it must perform this task as often as called on, and every court must do it”). 
 203. Id. at 672. 
 204. Using the Lexis and Westlaw databases, I could not find any reported case involving an 
objection to the validity of a statute because the House used a self-executing rule to enact it. However, 
modern cases challenging the validity of a federal law based on the claim that the House and Senate 
passed different texts, even if inadvertently, do exist and the lower federal courts routinely have 
rejected such claims based on the enrolled bill doctrine. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 
1342, 1351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 99–101 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46–47 (2d Cir. 1988); Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 444 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1096–97 (E.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 523 F.3d 1025 
(9th Cir. 2008); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 
n.7 (1993) (reaffirming the Field doctrine, noting that the “doctrine does not preclude us from asking 
whether the statute means something other than what the punctuation dictates,” and observing that, 
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accept the attestation of the Speaker, President of the Senate, and President 
of the United States, that a particular bill was enacted into law. 
The Supreme Court has never overruled Field and has applied the 
presumption that official records are conclusive of legislative action in 
other contexts, such as when questions arise regarding the ratification of a 
constitutional amendment.
205
 As recently as Baker v. Carr, the Supreme 
Court reiterated its commitment to this doctrine of non-justiciability.
206
 If 
the rule remains good law, then a reviewing court might well refuse to 
consider the procedural validity of an enrolled bill, even if the House of 
Representatives passed a bill using a self-executing deem-and-pass rule. 
The broader rule against considering political questions also might 
present difficulties for obtaining adjudication on the merits of an objection 
to enactment by implication through a self-executing rule. Writing in 
Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan described cases that involve political 
questions: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.
207
 
 
 
instead, the enrolled bill doctrine “concerns the nature of the evidence the Court [may] consider in 
determining whether a bill ha[s] actually passed Congress; it places no limits on the evidence a court 
may consider in determining the meaning of a bill that has passed Congress” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 205. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (holding that federal courts will not 
inquire into the validity of a state’s ratification of a constitutional amendment and that, instead, 
“official notice to the Secretary [of State], duly authenticated, that [a state had ratified an amendment] 
was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts”). 
In Leser the Court further stated, “The rule declared in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669–673, [sic] is 
applicable here.” 
 206. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214–15 (1962) (stating and citing with approval the doctrine 
that courts will not inquire into the procedural adequacy of enrolled bills signed into law by the 
President). 
 207. Id. at 217. 
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Certainly, a colorable argument exists that determining the rules for 
passage of a bill in either house of Congress falls within the scope of the 
“political question” doctrine. 
First, the Constitution, by a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment,”208 gives each house the power to determine its own rules of 
procedure.
209
 When considering whether a textually demonstrable 
commitment exists, however, a reviewing court “must, in the first 
instance, interpret the text in question and determine whether and to what 
extent the issue is textually committed.”210 Moreover, 
the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political 
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the 
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a 
coordinate branch.
211
 
In this instance, Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 seems to vest the power 
to make each house of Congress’s rules of procedure in the houses 
themselves. Moreover, for the federal courts to prescribe rules of 
procedure in Congress would seem incongruous with the level of respect 
that should be afforded a coordinate branch of the federal government. For 
example, would the Supreme Court accept as binding a statute that 
purported to govern the procedures used for granting a writ of certiorari? 
Or perhaps a rule that prescribes procedures for how the Justices 
conference on cases after oral argument? Thus, generic separation of 
powers concerns would seem to augur against reaching the merits of a 
challenge to the deem-and-pass maneuver. 
The cases arising under the political question doctrine also seem to 
support this conclusion—at least to a point. Nixon v. United States,212 for 
example, holds that the Constitution vests the “sole Power to try all 
impeachments” in the Senate, and that this language both vests the 
determination of an impeachment trial in the Senate alone and also “lacks 
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review 
 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a 
Member.”). 
 210. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
 211. Id. at 228–29. 
 212. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
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of the Senate’s actions.”213 Thus, just as “[t]he commonsense meaning of 
the word ‘sole’ is that the Senate alone shall have authority to determine 
whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted,”214 the power to 
establish rules of procedure would seem to give each house of Congress 
broad authority to adopt and enforce internal rules of operation. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court did find that an effort to exclude 
an elected member of Congress presented a justiciable question, 
notwithstanding the language of Article I, Section 5, which provides that 
“Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own 
Members.”215 The Court, in Powell v. McCormack, concluded that the 
House enjoyed broad discretion to enforce the eligibility requirements set 
forth in Article I, Section 2 and to exclude persons who failed to meet 
these specified qualifications, but also held that this clause did not 
empower the House to impose additional qualifications for office. “If 
examination of § 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the House 
judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to 
judge whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further 
review of the House determination might well be barred by the political 
question doctrine.”216 
Because resolution of the question presented was not exclusively 
vested in the House itself, and because “a determination of petitioner 
Powell’s right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the 
Constitution,”217 the claim did not present a non-justiciable political 
question. Instead, the constitutional question at issue in Powell fell “within 
the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and d[id] not 
involve a ‘lack of the respect due [a] co-ordinate [branch] of government,’ 
nor d[id] it involve an ‘initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
non-judicial discretion.’”218 
Similarly, if a reviewing court focused on the language of Article I, 
Section 7,
219
 the court could prove willing to determine what the word 
“pass” means. A focus on the word “pass” ought to be less susceptible to a 
 
 
 213. Id. at 229–31. 
 214. Id. at 231. 
 215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 216. Powell, 395 U.S. at 520. 
 217. Id. at 548. 
 218. Id. at 548–49 (quoting and citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (alterations in 
original)). 
 219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States . . . .”). 
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political question objection than attempting to argue that the federal courts 
enjoy the power to superintend the procedural rules of the House of 
Representatives. The Supreme Court consistently has been willing to parse 
the requirements of Article I, Section 7, interpreting the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements and strictly enforcing these limits, even when 
Congress and the President agree to modify or suspend them.
220
 If the 
Supreme Court was prepared to determine whether the legislative veto 
(Chadha) or the line item veto (Clinton) were consistent with Article I, 
Section 7, it should be no less willing to determine whether passage of a 
bill generally requires both houses of Congress to vote on the same 
question (rather than simply adopt the same text via non-identical votes). 
Simply put, identifying and enforcing a constitutionally required 
procedure does not involve second guessing the technicalities of procedure 
within either house of Congress. 
My sense is that, given a specific abstention doctrine (the enrolled bill 
doctrine) and a strong argument under more general non-justiciability 
principles (under Baker), the federal courts probably would agree not to 
opine on the constitutional adequacy of the House using a self-executing 
rule to deem a bill “passed” without ever voting directly on the bill by 
itself. This is not to say that such a claim is undoubtedly non-justiciable. 
Certainly, the Supreme Court might well conclude that “passing” a bill 
requires that both houses hold votes on identical questions were it to reach 
the merits. In other words, it is not enough simply that both houses enact 
the exact same language in the same—literally identical—bill, instead 
both houses must actually vote on the same precise question. 
Moreover, there are questions related to the enactment of a bill that 
might well prove to be justiciable because they fall on the Powell side of 
the line. This would be the case if the precise question at issue involved 
interpreting mandatory constitutional language, like the qualifications for 
service in the House, rather than ambiguous language that expressly vests 
a particular task or duty with either Congress or the President. 
For example, suppose the House maintained a rule that made 100 
members, rather than 218, a quorum to conduct business. The Constitution 
itself states that a majority of the House constitutes a quorum, and that 
only a quorum may conduct business.
221
 Suppose that, under this rule, 
 
 
 220. See infra notes 227–43 (discussing the holdings in Chadha and Clinton). 
 221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“[A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do 
Business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the 
Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may 
provide.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1071 
 
 
 
 
fifty-one members, with 100 members present, vote in favor of passing a 
bill on the floor, and the Speaker, consistent with the House rule, signs the 
bill and forwards it to the Senate. Would the Supreme Court apply Field 
and Baker and hold that the question of the enactment’s validity presents a 
non-justiciable political question? 
Powell seems to suggest that, when a house of Congress violates a 
clear constitutional limitation, the courts will reach the merits of the 
question. Were the House openly to violate a clear constitutional 
prerequisite to legislating, there would be a strong institutional urge for the 
federal courts to step in and enforce the Constitution’s plain text. It is, 
after all, “the responsibility of [the Supreme Court] to act as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution.”222 This approach also would be consistent 
with Justice Powell’s argument that “the existence of ‘a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department’ . . . turns on an examination of the constitutional 
provisions governing the exercise of the power in question.”223 Justice 
Powell argued that when the Constitution fails to provide a clear answer, 
and Congress and the President disagree about its meaning and reach an 
impasse, the federal courts have an absolute duty to resolve the 
question.
224
 
Under this approach, at least one set of facts could lead to a justiciable 
challenge to the use of a self-executing rule: if the House were to “deem 
passed” an override of a presidential veto, the President might well object. 
The President could well argue that the House might have failed to achieve 
the requisite two-thirds supermajority had the sole question pending before 
the House been whether or not to sustain her veto. Moreover, the express 
language of the veto override procedure refers to “the bill,” as opposed to 
the phrase “every bill” that describes the generic bicameralism 
requirement.
225
 To be sure, this hypothetical represents a scenario without 
a historical precedent because the House has never used a self-executing 
rule to deem-and-override a presidential veto. The House rules prescribe 
very specific procedures to govern a veto override vote.
226
 That said, 
nothing in the House rules seems to preclude the use of a special rule or 
 
 
 222. Powell, 395 U.S. at 549; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 223. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 224. See id. at 998–1001. As he stated the proposition, “If the President and the Congress had 
reached irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case would 
eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations.” Id. at 1001. 
 225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2 (emphasis added); see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 226. See HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 40, at 901–07. 
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order in the context of considering a presidential veto. In theory, a special 
rule or order should be capable of waiving any rule of the House, subject 
only to the requirement that the House adopt the special rule. 
A reviewing court would, in my view, be very likely to reach the merits 
of the question where the validity of an override would turn on the validity 
of a single floor vote passing additional unrelated bills. In other contexts, 
however, the federal courts would probably be more inclined to apply the 
enrolled bill and political question doctrines to avoid reaching the merits 
of a potential challenge to this practice. Thus, federal courts would likely 
find non-justiciable our hypothetical where the House uses a self-
executing rule to pass a Senate bill in addition to having other legislative 
effects. 
Moreover, INS v. Chadha
227
 clearly supports this analysis. In Chadha, 
Congress reserved for itself, through the vote of a single chamber, the 
right to rescind the Attorney General’s decision to suspend Chadha’s 
deportation from the United States.
228
 The Supreme Court invalidated this 
legislative veto, and all other legislative veto provisions, because Congress 
cannot execute a law and the enactment of a bill (perhaps requiring 
Chadha to be deported) requires bicameral passage of the bill and 
presentment of the bill to the President. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Burger explained that because “it is clear that the action by the 
House under § 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional 
exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally clear that it 
was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the 
standards prescribed in Art. I.”229 In particular, “[t]he bicameral 
requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President’s veto, and 
Congress’s power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring 
checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident 
exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps.”230 Moreover, 
these procedural steps, crucial to the maintenance of the separation of 
powers, “must not be eroded.”231 
Were the House of Representatives to deny the President a clean up-or-
down vote when attempting to override a veto, a good argument exists that 
this action would deny the President a mandatory procedural protection 
 
 
 227. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 228. See id. at 925–28. 
 229. Id. at 956–57. 
 230. Id. at 957. 
 231. Id. at 958. 
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imposed by the text of Article I, Section 7.
232
 Complicating a veto override 
vote by annexing legislative consideration of a wholly unrelated act would 
seem to alter a mandatory legislative procedure, particularly from a 
formalist perspective. From a functionalist perspective, however, it might 
well be that so long as the members of the House know that an “aye” vote 
will have the effect of re-passing a bill over a presidential veto, the fact 
that the vote would have other, perhaps entirely unrelated, legislative 
effects would not matter.
233
 Regardless of how a particular judge or court 
would rule on the merits, however, the question itself would be justiciable. 
Finally, although avoiding a decision on the merits in a challenge to the 
use of self-executing rules outside the context of a presidential veto would 
not involve a difficult judicial drafting exercise, it is also true that the 
Supreme Court would not be compelled to decline to reach the merits in a 
case involving the use of a single floor vote to pass multiple bills 
according to the prescriptions of Field and Baker.
234
 For example, in 
Clinton v. City of New York,
235
 the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory 
procedure that permitted the President to disallow “any dollar amount of 
discretionary budget authority,” “any item of new direct spending,” or 
“any limited tax benefit.”236 The Supreme Court invalidated the Line Item 
Veto Act because “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has 
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each” and repeal 
of a statute requires bicameral action by Congress.
237
 “There is no 
 
 
 232. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 976–78 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the constitutionality of 
the legislative veto is anything but clear-cut,” noting the frequent use of the legislative veto device “in 
nearly 200 separate laws over a period of 50 years,” and suggesting that the Supreme Court’s task 
“should be to determine whether the legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of Art. I and the 
principles of separation of powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the 
Constitution”); id. at 986 (“If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and Executive 
agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check of 
legislative power for itself.”). 
 234. Again, because the House could consider a new bill at will, it seems difficult to see any 
serious objection to the use of a self-executing rule to incorporate amendments or to structure the 
voting sequence on amendments on the floor of the chamber. This kind of activity would seem to lie at 
the very core of the Article I, Section 5 power to establish rules of procedure. On the other hand, when 
a self-executing rule vests a single floor vote with multiple legislative effects that involve sending a 
bill to the Senate or to the President, the procedure has the effect of essentially permitting the House of 
Representatives to adopt the same text as the Senate has adopted (or could adopt), but through a non-
identical vote. If the passage of a bill in the House requires not merely an identical text, but also an 
identical vote, this use of the procedure might well be objectionable, even if not justiciable. See supra 
notes 215–25 and accompanying text. 
 235. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 236. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 1021, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 691(a)); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436. 
 237. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DECONSTRUCTING DEEM AND PASS 1129 
 
 
 
 
provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to 
amend, or to repeal statutes.”238 
The Solicitor General argued that the Constitution’s silence on the 
question of whether Congress could create a line-item veto by statute 
should mean that if Congress wished to create such a power it could do so. 
Writing for the majority, however, Justice Stevens clearly rejected this 
reasoning, arguing that “[t]here are powerful reasons for construing 
constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to 
an express prohibition.”239 He explained that “[t]he procedures governing 
the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product 
of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution 
itself.”240 From this perspective, the “finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered” procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7 cannot be altered or 
amended in any way.
241
 If these procedures impose not merely a duty to 
enact the same text, “line for line and jot for jot,”242 but also a duty to vote 
on exactly the same question as the other house, the Supreme Court might 
find that the use of a self-executing rule that permits the House to avoid 
taking the same vote as the Senate took—or will take, in the case of a 
House-originated bill—violates the separation of powers. The Framers 
arguably intended that passage of a bill would require both chambers to 
take political responsibility for the same proposition.
243
 When the House 
uses a self-executing rule to permit a single vote to pass multiple bills, 
however, the members of the House take responsibility for a different set 
of legislative outcomes than does the Senate. 
In the end, then, the resolution of the question involves an inherent 
tension between the Constitution’s obvious grant of unilateral authority to 
 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 439; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no 
constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must be 
sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the 
jurisprudence of this Court.”). 
 240. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439. 
 241. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439–40. 
 242. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (advocating total 
incorporation of the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights against the states, but disclaiming any 
legitimate judicial power to recognize or enforce any additional non-textual rights against the state 
governments). For a discussion and critique of Justice Black’s strict textualist approach to defining 
constitutional rights and obligations, see Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot-
for-Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1115–19, 1121 (discussing the 
line-for-line, jot-for-jot approach to applying the doctrine of substantive due process). 
 243. See supra notes 169–80, 184 and accompanying text. 
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each house of Congress to establish its own rules of procedure,
244
 and the 
Constitution’s requirements regarding passage of a bill into law.245 If one 
conceives of using a special self-executing rule as merely a matter of 
internal housekeeping, then the logical conclusion would be to find that 
the question is precluded by either the enrolled bill or political question 
doctrine. On the other hand, if one sees the use of a self-executing rule as a 
mere subterfuge adopted to avoid having the House vote on the same 
question as the Senate, the logical conclusion should be that the House 
procedure has the effect of amending Article I, Section 7’s requirements 
for passage of a bill. The Supreme Court should disallow any efforts to 
modify the procedures used to pass a bill into law under the precedents set 
in Clinton and Chadha. 
I suspect that the question of justiciability would be collapsed into the 
merits at the end of the day, and that the outcome would depend on 
whether one takes a formalist or functionalist view of the question 
presented.
246
 A formalist would likely conclude that the House has created 
a new and unauthorized procedure that impermissibly departs from the 
legislative procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7, and that this goes 
well beyond the permissible scope of establishing procedural rules under 
Article I, Section 5. A functionalist, however, would likely conclude that a 
single floor vote could pass an unlimited number of bills, provided that the 
vote being used to link various separate and unrelated legislative effects 
secures the requisite majority and that the members of the House are clear 
on the effect of their floor vote. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the constitutionality of the use of a special self-executing 
rule to use a single floor vote to pass multiple bills—outside the context of 
overriding a veto—likely depends on whether one self-describes as a 
formalist or functionalist on separation of powers questions. For a 
formalist, a proper reading of Article I, Section 7 mandates that each house 
of Congress vote on the same question, and not merely adopt the same text 
 
 
 244. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 245. See id. art. I, § 7. 
 246. See Krotoszynski, supra note 164, at 475–85. As I have noted before, “It is more than a little 
ironic that the Supreme Court has deployed formalist reasoning to strike down novel power-sharing 
arrangements between Congress and the President, but has relied on functional reasoning to permit the 
transfer of legislative and executive duties to Article III personnel.” Id. at 480; see Jellum, supra note 
22, at 860–79; but cf. Magill, supra note 22, at 604–10, 650–51 (questioning the utility of the 
formalism/functionalism dichotomy in separation of powers theory and practice). 
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via non-parallel or mirror-image votes. From a functionalist perspective, 
however, a decision to use a single vote to enact multiple bills probably 
would not present any fundamental objections. Provided that the members 
of the House are aware of the precise legislative effects of a “yes” or “no” 
vote—as would be the case if the members first adopt a special self-
executing rule—the fact that the House uses a single vote to act on 
multiple bills should not be problematic. 
Thus, it should not be surprising that Professor Balkin (a functionalist) 
and Professor McConnell (a formalist) would reach opposite and 
contradictory conclusions regarding the permissibility of the proposed 
“Slaughter Solution.” For a formalist, the House effort to use a single vote 
to advance a bill to the White House, while attempting to amend it 
incident to the same vote, transgresses the requirement that both houses 
act identically to adopt the same text. For a functionalist, the deem-and-
pass self-executing rule does not raise any constitutional difficulties 
precisely because the House members are aware that the legislative effect 
of a “yes” vote will simultaneously send the Senate bill to the President 
and the House-initiated amendatory bill to the Senate. 
In my view, the formalist solution appears more attractive because the 
objective of a self-executing rule is to obfuscate the nature of the vote, in 
the hope of attenuating political accountability for the full effects of the 
vote.
247
 A parliamentary device used to render the legislative process less 
transparent has, on its face, little to recommend it. A federal court 
committed to strictly enforcing the Framer’s vision of democratically 
accountable self-government should be leery of the practice because the 
underlying purpose of the maneuver is to permit members to credibly 
disclaim responsibility for unpopular legislation. A strong presumption 
should exist against a procedure intended to reduce or impede 
accountability given that the whole raison d’être of the separation of 
powers, and the concomitant requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment, is to ensure full and complete political accountability for 
federal legislation.
248
 
 
 
 247. See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1017–18. 
 248. Moreover, if the House were to attempt to use the procedure to override a presidential veto, a 
compelling textual argument would exist against the constitutionality of the practice in this specific 
context. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. Accordingly, even a committed functionalist, 
like Professor Balkin, should agree that, whatever the merits of deem-and-pass in the context of 
advancing a bill from the Senate or a House-originated bill concurrently with other legislation, the 
Constitution plainly anticipates that each house of Congress must take a stand-alone vote on whether 
to sustain or override a presidential veto. 
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The deem-and-pass special rule, like the legislative veto, constitutes a 
parliamentary invention of the New Deal Congress. Whether in 1933 or 
today, using a novel parliamentary practice in order to logroll votes 
undoubtedly can be highly politically useful and quite conducive to the 
efficient disposition of legislation in the House.
249
 Nevertheless, the 
practice should be rejected because it renders political accountability more 
difficult and exists principally to achieve precisely this result. 
 
 
 249. See Gilbert, supra note 91, at 813–15 (discussing the problem of logrolling and responses 
adopted to address these problems); Ruud, supra note 91, at 389–90 (same). 
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